Exercises and Adversaries: The Risks of Military Exercises by Garrett, Alaina et al.
  
 
 
Exercises and Adversaries: The Risks of Military Exercises 
Capstone Project for the RAND Corporation’s Intelligence Policy Center  Capstone Advisor: Dr. Jasen J. Castillo  2016  
1  
 
   
  
 
Exercises and Adversaries: 
The Risks of Military Exercises 
 
Capstone Advisor: Dr. Jasen J. Castillo 
 
Alaina Garrett 
Kerrie Ford 
Matt Grimm 
Nathaniel Haight 
Robert Allison 
 
2016 
2  
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents  ............................................................................................................... 2 
Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................... 3 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. 4 
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ 5 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 6  
Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 9  
Analytical Framework ...................................................................................................... 11  
Political Environment ................................................................................................... 12 
Threat Level of the Exercise ......................................................................................... 15 
Proximity................................................................................................................... 15 
Magnitude. ................................................................................................................ 16 
Transparency. ............................................................................................................ 16 
Special Cases: Nuclear, Cyber, Space ...................................................................... 17 
Risk Matrix ................................................................................................................... 19  
The Dangers of Military Exercises ................................................................................... 21 
Historical Case Studies ..................................................................................................... 28 
Accident: Hainan Island Incident, 2001........................................................................ 29 
Hostility: Steadfast Jazz 2013 ....................................................................................... 31 
Reciprocity: Immediate Response 2008 ....................................................................... 34 
Crisis: Able Archer 1983 .............................................................................................. 36 
Recommendations ............................................................................................................. 39  
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 45  
Appendix A: Variable Explanations ................................................................................. 46 
Appendix B: Additional Case Studies .............................................................................. 54 
Accidents: RIMPAC 2014 ............................................................................................ 54 
Hostility: Cold Response 2012 ..................................................................................... 56 
Reciprocity: Trident Juncture 2015 and Center 2015 ................................................... 58 
Crises: Exercise Brasstacks 1986.................................................................................. 61 
Appendix C: Overview of the Bush School Military Exercise Dataset ............................ 64 
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 68 
Presentation Slides ............................................................................................................ 70 
3  
Abbreviations 
AGI Auxiliary General Intelligence 
CFE Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
ELN European Leadership Network 
EU European Union 
IRBM Intermediate-Range Nuclear Missiles 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NDN Northern Distribution Network 
NRF NATO Response Force 
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
PfP Partnership for Peace 
PLA People’s Liberation Army 
PRC People’s Republic of China 
SDI Strategic Defense Initiative 
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
USAFRICOM United States Africa Command 
USEUCOM United States European Command 
USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command 
USPACOM United States Pacific Command 
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 
USSOUTHCOM United States South Command 
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 
USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 
  
4  
Acknowledgements 
We are indebted to John V. Parachini for his helpful feedback, suggestions, and generous 
sponsorship of this project. We would also like to extend our thanks to Dr. Karl P. Mueller and 
Dr. Adam R. Grissom for their advice and comments on the suitability of our framework. 
Additionally, we would like to thank Abby Doll, Dr. Stacie L. Pettyjohn, David A. Shlapak, Dr. 
Michael Spirtas, and Rebeca Orrie for assessing our project and providing avenues for 
improvement. 
We are also thankful to faculty, staff, and students of the Bush School of Government and 
Public Service at Texas A&M for their support and recommendations. 
Lastly, we are grateful to Dr. Jasen J. Castillo, for his direction, guidance, and 
encouragement. His support and feedback was essential in directing and refining our product. 
 
  
5  
Executive Summary 
The U.S. and NATO run hundreds of military exercises each year, which are intended to 
build capabilities, reassure allies, and to deter adversaries. Despite these goals, military exercises 
can lead to unintended consequences because adversaries may have incentives to respond that the 
country running the exercise fails to anticipate. This study examines the potential risks that military 
exercises can create due to adversary reactions and offers a framework to help combatant 
commanders better evaluate and mitigate such risks.  
We argue that military exercises can create four types of risk—accidents, hostility, 
reciprocity, and crises. The level of risk an exercise creates is determined by two factors. The first 
factor is the political environment between the country running the exercise and the potential 
adversary. The second factor is the perceived level of threat an exercise creates for an adversary. 
Exercises that have close proximity to the adversary, have high magnitude, and have low 
transparency all increase the threat level of a military exercise. This creates incentives for an 
adversary to respond in a way that creates risks for all parties. 
Over the course of our four month study, we collected information on over 200 large 
military exercises from 1969-2016. Using this data, we determined the dangers military exercises 
create and examined the effects of military exercises over time. We then created an analytical 
framework, which a combatant commander can use this to evaluate and mitigate the risks a military 
exercise may run. To test the plausibility and utility of our framework, we conducted case studies 
on several military exercises that had resulted in negative outcomes. By examining these cases in-
depth, we were able to isolate the conditions under which military exercises create danger.  
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Introduction 
Every year the U.S. runs hundreds of security cooperation activities across the globe, 
including several dozen “major” joint military exercises.1 In 2015 the U.S. and NATO conducted 
or participated in nearly 300 military exercises in Europe alone.2 Although these exercises range 
greatly in size and mission, they are designed to build military capabilities, improve 
interoperability, reassure allies, and deter adversaries.3 In rare cases, countries have used military 
exercises to mask troop movements in the lead up to war.4 Despite the routine and ubiquitous 
nature of most military exercises, they are not without danger. Because military exercises involve 
military personnel and equipment, they can appear threatening to potential adversaries, who may 
respond in unanticipated ways that create risk. 
Given the high number of exercises that the U.S., its allies, and its adversaries run and the 
increasing tempo of military exercises in some parts of the world,5 the potential for unintended 
                                                 1 In 2011, U.S. geographic combatant commands planned or ran 14 major joint exercises in Africa, 22 in Europe, and 18 in the Pacific region, as defined by the combatant commands. CENTCOM, NORTHCOM, and SOUTHCOM also ran exercises and military-to-military training operations, but specific numbers were unavailable. See Andrew Feickert, The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. R42077) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 35-57, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42077.pdf. 2 “The Secretary General’s Annual Report, 2015,” NATO (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2016), 33, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_01/20160128_SG_AnnualReport_2015_en.pdf. 3 Kathleen J. McInnis and Nathan J. Lucas, What Is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. R44313), (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 8, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44313.pdf. See “The Secretary General’s Annual Report, 2015” 33-34. 4 Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1982).  Even in recent years, military exercises have been used as a cover for invasion forces. In 2008, Russia used the military exercise Kavkaz 2008 to move troops to and through the Northern Caucasus, shortly before the invasion of Georgia. See Brian Whitmore, “Did Russia Plan Its War In Georgia?” Radio Free Europe: Radio Liberty, August 15, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/content/Did_Russia_Plan_Its_War_In_Georgia__/1191460.html. In 2014, Russia masked its invasion of Crimea with an exercise of 150,000 personnel. See Ian J. Brzezinksi and Nicolas Varangis, “The NATO-Russia Exercise Gap,” Atlantic Council, February 23, 2015, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/the-nato-russia-exercise-gap.  5 In 2015, while NATO ran 297 exercises, Russia ran over 4,000 military exercises. See Christopher Harress, “Russian Military Defense Drills 2015: 4,000 Exercises By Armed Forces Conducted This Year, Up From 2014” The International Business Times, September 29, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/russian-military-defense-drills-2015-4000-exercises-armed-forces-conducted-year-2014-2118576. 
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political or military consequences is high. Military exercises create risk because a combatant 
commander or other official planning an exercise may misperceive how a potential adversary will 
respond. It is difficult to determine another country’s intentions and motives and adversaries may 
have incentives to interpret these in a certain way.6 Potential adversaries may believe a military 
exercise is threatening, regardless of the intent or motive behind the exercise. This creates an 
incentive for an adversary to respond, which can create risk. 
Despite these risks, policy makers, military planners, and academics have not studied the 
effects of military exercises in-depth. As such, they may underestimate the potential risks. Military 
exercises are frequent events that often occur on an annual or biannual basis.7 Unlike combat 
situations, some military exercises are so routine that they do not warrant press releases, even by 
largely transparent organizations like NATO.8 Because military planners may see exercises as 
routine, they may miss the larger stability implications of some military exercises.9 Additionally, 
because military exercises are often communicated through signaling, the potential for 
misunderstandings is high—rarely do countries have an accurate perception of each other’s 
motives and intentions.10 This means military exercises create risks that may be unanticipated, as 
a combatant commander may not know or fully evaluate the incentives and motives a potential 
adversary has to respond. 
                                                 6 Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976); Charles L. Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models.” World Politics 44, no. 4 (July 1992); Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 7 See “Appendix C: Overview of the Bush School Military Exercise Dataset.” 8 “Exercises and Training,” NATO: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, accessed April 17th, 2016, http://www.shape.nato.int/exercises. 9 Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994): 71-74, https://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.library.tamu.edu/article/447097/pdf. 10 Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence. 
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To address the risks military exercises create, this paper asks two questions. First, when 
and why are military exercises dangerous? Because military exercises occur in different political 
environments and create different perceptions of threat to adversarial countries, they run different 
risks—including accidents, hostility, reciprocity, and crises. Second, how can a combatant 
commander mitigate the risks of a military exercise? Although risk mitigation strategies can take 
place at multiple levels of the political and military chain, we focus on the strategies within a 
combatant commander’s control. We do this because combatant commanders are tasked with 
planning and carrying out military exercises,11 are responsible for U.S. military action in the 
regions where military exercises are conducted,12 and can mitigate risks at the operational level.13 
To answer these questions, we collected data on over 200 large, military exercises. We 
present our methodology in the first section of the paper. In the second section, we present an 
analytical framework to evaluate the potential risks a military exercise might create. We then 
discuss the dangers military exercises create, which we discovered through our review of historical 
military exercises and relevant literature. We also provide a larger examination of how the 
unintended consequences of military exercises can combine over time, leading to escalation. We 
then offer a series of historical cases studies, which we used to test the plausibility and utility of 
our framework. Using this, we show how exercises have led to negative outcomes and how a 
combatant commander might evaluate and alter a military exercise to reduce risks. We then 
provide a series of recommendations a combatant commander can use to identify and mitigate the 
risks of military exercises. 
                                                 11 Feickert, The Unified Command Plan, 12-14. 12 Ibid., 1-2. 13 “Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,” March 25, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/Sites/Unified-Combatant-Commands. 
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Methodology 
To assess what risks military exercises create and what factors influence the realization of 
these risks, we collected data on over 200 exercises spanning 1969-2016. By examining these 
cases, we determined what risks military exercises create and what factors lead to these risks. 
 
Focus of the Study 
Our study looks at military exercises, which are defined as “simulated wartime 
exercises.”14 This definition includes both combat simulations and exercises focused on other 
missions, such as anti-piracy and crisis response. The study excludes shows of force, missile tests, 
and other provocations when they occur outside of the context of military exercises. We also 
exclude traditional military training when it does not occur in the context of a stated military 
exercise or does not involve troop movements. By focusing solely on military exercises, we are 
able to determine what risks military exercises can create, rather than the potential risks of general 
military actions. 
Additionally, although military exercises may pose dangers or risks in unsustainable 
funding,15 undermined deterrence because of poor performance or under-commitment,16 and the 
alienation of allies over disagreements,17 we focus on the risks adversarial responses create 
                                                 14 Department of the U.S. Army, Training: Army Exercises (Army Regulations 350-28), (Washington DC: Army Headquarters, 1997), 3-6, http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r350_28.pdf. 15 Janet A. St. Laurent, Building Partner Capacity: Key Practices to Effectively Manage Department of Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation (GAO-13-335T) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013), 13-15, http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652159.pdf. 16 In 2013, the U.S. sent only 200 personnel to a major military exercise, equaling the Estonian forces, which led to allied concerns over a lack of commitment. See Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, “Steadfast Jazz 2013: U.S. Lackluster Contribution Undermines U.S. Interests in Eastern Europe,” Heritage Foundation, November 1, 2013, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/11/steadfast-jazz-2013-us-lackluster-contribution-undermines-us-interests-in-eastern-europe. 17 Exercises can cause domestic anger. NATO’s Operation Dragoon Ride 2015 drew a crowd of anti-NATO protesters in the Czech Republic. See Rick Lyman, “An American Military Convoy in Europe Aims to Reassure 
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because of another country’s military exercises. This relationship creates unique dangers, can lead 
to escalation, and has largely been ignored in the existing literature. 
 
Data Collection 
Over the course of four months, we collected data on 200 military exercises spanning 1969-
2016.18 Because military exercises are considered sensitive, are fairly routine, and are sometimes 
concealed, many countries do not publish data on their military exercises. As such, we utilized 
press releases and news reports to collect information on military exercise metrics, including 
location, duration, force size, and other variables. Given the time constraints, the lack of published 
research on the topic, and the limited availability of data, we focused our efforts on large magnitude 
military exercises that involved more than 1,000 personnel. Large magnitude exercises are the 
most likely to receive news coverage and to be discovered if the exercise is concealed. 
Additionally, recent military exercises are more likely to have data available. Of the 200 military 
exercises we collected, 81% occurred after 2001.19 By researching large military exercises, we 
developed a first-cut military exercise dataset that allowed us to examine the effects of military 
exercises. 
 Although we look at exercises involving many countries, our primary focus is on exercises 
involving or occurring in close proximity to Russia and China, because the U.S. has particularly 
contentious relations with these countries. We also examine specific geographic regions, including 
                                                 Allies,” The New York Times, March 29, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/30/world/europe/an-american-military-convoy-in-europe-aims-to-reassure-allies.html. Since 2005, environmental groups have protested the U.S.-Australian biannual Talisman Saber exercise. See Oliver Milman, “Great Barrier Reef bombing the latest mishap from 'war games,'” The Guardian, July 22, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/jul/22/great-barrier-reef-bombing-war-games. 18 See “Appendix C: Overview of the Bush School Military Exercises Dataset.” 19 Ibid. 
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the Arctic, because the U.S. and other countries run large military exercises in these regions. This 
increases the potential for unanticipated consequences. Of the exercises in our dataset, Russia led 
over 28%, the U.S. led 27% (excluding NATO), and NATO ran 29%. By focusing on potential 
adversaries and in contentious regions, we are able better measure outcomes from military 
exercises. 
 
Sampling 
Our dataset provided a means to understand potential risks and a way to testing our 
framework. By utilizing our dataset of cases, we determined what dangers military exercises may 
create and found the specific factors that contribute to these risks. We first identified these risks 
by examining the responses to historical exercises. We then used our dataset to design an analytical 
framework capable of explaining the conditions under which an exercises creates risk, by looking 
at the environment in which exercises occurred, the types of exercises that were run, and the 
outcomes military exercises created. Lastly, our dataset provided a sample source of cases, which 
we explored in-depth to find the causal pathway leading to risk realization. The sample of cases in 
our military exercise dataset allow us to test our framework and show how military exercises can 
lead to unanticipated consequences and danger. 
 
Analytical Framework 
By combining the data we collected on military exercises, we developed an analytical 
framework to assess what type of risks a military exercises can create. We find that different factors 
influence the level of risks an exercise runs. Ultimately, two variables determine the risks a military 
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exercise creates—the political environment and the perceived threat level of the exercise. By 
understanding these factors, a combatant commander can evaluate the risks of military exercises. 
We used the political environment and perceived threat level of military exercises to create 
a framework that highlights the risks a military exercise may run due to adversarial responses. 
While adversaries may have different domestic incentives to respond to military exercises, our 
framework captures the factors that a combatant commander is likely to know—the political 
environment—and the factors that he or she is able to calibrate—the exercise itself. This allows us 
to create a “Risk Matrix,” which a combatant commander can use to determine and calibrate what 
risks a military exercise is likely to run. 
Our framework allows for the evaluation of risk from any potential adversary’s perspective. 
It is rare for the mission statement of a military exercise to target an adversarial country. Because 
of misperceptions, miscalculation, and signaling, a potential adversary may find the mission of an 
exercise threatening, even when the exercise is not specifically targeted against them. For these 
reasons, our framework interprets “adversaries” very broadly—the political environment and 
threat level of an exercise can be evaluated using any country dyad. 
 
Political Environment 
The first factor determining the potential risks a military exercise creates is the political 
environment the country running the exercise and the adversary share. Adversaries react to military 
exercises in different ways based on the political environment they inhabit. When a situation is 
“hostile,” countries have strong incentives to respond to military exercises, since concerns about 
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intentions may be strong.20 While they may respond politically, countries in this environment have 
added incentives to respond aggressively with military action21 in the form of reciprocal military 
exercises or actual military maneuvers. When the political situation is “non-hostile,” countries are 
more likely to respond to military exercises with political actions.22 
The political environment works through two mechanisms—the incentives it creates to 
respond to military exercises and the apparatuses that allow responses between states. When a 
relationship is non-hostile, the incentive may exist to maintain the political relationship, even in 
the face of threatening military exercises. In a non-hostile environment, states may also have the 
stable political relationship to address the concerns raised by military exercises in a political 
forum.23 When a relationship is hostile, however, a state is more likely to respond with military 
force (although political responses occur as well), because the threat posed by military or political 
belligerency outweighs the incentives to repair the political relationship.24 
Although military exercises may have influenced the political environment in the past and 
may influence it in the future (by creating hostile relations or by increasing cooperation through 
exercises), these mechanisms are externally created through the execution of a military exercise. 
The combatant commander does not control the political environment when planning a military 
exercise. 
To code the political environment, we use a rough measure of provocative acts and positive 
overtures in the previous year, from the perspective of countries participating in an exercise and 
                                                 20 Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence. 21 Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50, no. 1 (October 1997): 171-201. 22 See “Appendix C: Overview of the Bush School Military Exercise Dataset.” 23 Rose McDermott, Jonathan A. Cowden, and Stephen Rosen, “The role of hostile communications in a crisis simulation game,” Peace And Conflict: Journal Of Peace Psychology 14, no. 2: 151-167. 24 Ibid. 
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the adversarial country of interest.25 Because this study focuses on the risk created by military 
threats, we prioritize the military relationship when looking at the political environment. We count 
negative and provocative actions, including changes in force basing, shows of force, military 
invasions, skirmishes, and conflict, as well as positive overtures like mil-to-mil cooperation. As a 
secondary consideration, we also examine both hostile and positive political acts, such as levying 
or removing sanctions, ousting or strengthening the relationship between political figures and 
international organizations, and suspending or joining treaties. This allows us to determine when 
a political relationship is hostile and when it is non-hostile. 
Of course, within the political realm there is great gradation—the political environment is 
rarely clearly definable as “hostile” or “non-hostile.” In some cases, the political relationship 
between two countries has transitioned frequently; in others, the political relationship has remained 
consistent over time. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. relationship with Russia has oscillated 
between non-hostility, including the Russian ‘reset,’ and hostility, such as the annexation of 
Crimea.26 Often within a country dyad there are hostile issue areas and non-hostile issue areas. For 
example, while the U.S. has been able to cooperate with China on trade, there is great security 
competition in other arenas.27 This study examines the political environment across interest 
areas.28 
 
                                                 25 See “Appendix A: Variable Explanations” for exact coding rules. 26 Jim Nichol, Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests (CRS Report No. RL33407), (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33407.pdf, 49-60. 27 Wayne M. Morrison, China-U.S. Trade Issues (CRS Report No. RL33536), (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf, 1-3. 28 See “Appendix A: Variable Explanations” for exact coding rules. 
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Threat Level of the Exercise 
The second determinant of the risks a military exercise may 
create is the perceived level of threat of the military exercise to the 
adversary. Because military exercises can signal hostile intentions and 
motives, they may appear threatening to adversaries. The threat level 
of an exercise is determined by three factors—the proximity of the 
exercise, the magnitude of the exercise, and the transparency of the 
exercise. By combining these three factors, a combatant commander 
can determine the perceived threat level of a military exercise. Within 
the bounds of set policy, a combatant commander can reduce this threat 
level by calibrating military exercises along these three variables. 
 
Proximity. 
Proximity is one of the most important determinants of the threat level of an exercise 
because it may signal a clear adversarial target and because military exercises can mask troop 
movements in the lead up to an invasion.29 For the country running an exercise, operating in theater 
allows for realistic training. However, exercises held along an adversary’s border, in its border 
region, or in its areas of interest are also highly threatening to the adversary because they could 
pose an immediate or future threat.30 Exercises held at great distances are less threatening, as they 
do not present a direct military threat, but may present a future threat as military capabilities are 
                                                 29 Betts, Surprise Attack.  30 Ibid.  
 
 
 
THREAT 
Transparency   Magnitude   Proximity  
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built.31 (Military exercises involving nuclear, cyber, or space create a special case of close 
proximity, even when held at great distances, as discussed below.) 
 
Magnitude. 
Because military exercises build capabilities that can be used in future conflicts and can 
signal a country’s beliefs about the likelihood of upcoming conflicts, magnitude is equally 
important in determining the perceived threat level of the exercise. Large military exercises can 
appear threatening, even when held at a distance, because they can be used to build capabilities for 
future conflicts. Large military exercises held in border regions are particularly threatening, as they 
can mask an invasion force, which creates incentives for adversaries to respond.32 
Because certain types of military forces may be considered more threatening to an 
adversary’s security, magnitude is calculated as a composite variable consisting of force size, 
percentage increase between repeated iterations of an exercise, and force mix, when information 
is available.33 
 
Transparency. 
The third determinant of the perceived threat level of an exercise is the level of 
transparency. Because military exercises can be mistaken for actual military maneuvers, 
transparency plays an important role in mitigating the threat level of exercises. Transparency 
                                                 31 See “Appendix A: Variable Explanations” for coding rules. 32 Betts, Surprise Attack. 33  See “Appendix A: Variable Explanations” for coding rules. 
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within military exercises ranges from non-transparent, concealed exercises to highly transparent 
exercises with adversarial participation:34 
 
While the U.S. and NATO traditionally offer long notice of military exercises and usually invite 
the adversary to observe, as required by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) Vienna Document, other countries are not as open.35 Since 2014, Russia has routinely run 
snap exercises without giving any notice.36 Given Russia’s history of using military exercises as a 
cover for invasions, these snap exercises are highly threatening.37 When transparency is not 
offered, the threat level of an exercise increases significantly. When standard notice is offered, 
only adversarial observer status and participation can lower the threat level of an exercise. 
 
Special Cases: Nuclear, Cyber, Space 
Although proximity, magnitude, and transparency capture the threat level of nearly all 
military exercises, three special cases exist—nuclear, cyber, and space—that can also influence 
the threat level of an exercise. 
                                                 34  See “Appendix A: Variable Explanations” for coding rules. 35 “Statement by NATO Deputy Spokesperson Carmen Romero on NATO military exercises,” NATO, August 12, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_122048.htm. 36 Martin Hurt, “Preempting Further Russian Aggression Against Europe,” in 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength: Assessing America’s Ability to Provide for the Common Defense, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington DC: Heritage Foundation, 2016), 37-42. 37 Pavel Felgenhauer, “Sudden Massive Snap Exercise and Mobilization of Russian Forces in Black Sea and Caspian Region Appears Aimed at Turkey,” Jamestown Foundation: Eurasia Daily Monitor 11, no. 29, February 11, 2016, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=45088. 
  Concealed  No Notice  Short Notice  Long Notice  Limited Participation  Full Participation 
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Given the potentially catastrophic damage possible with nuclear weapons, the inclusion of 
nuclear weapons, even if only in a command post exercise, potentially raises the perceived threat 
of a military exercise.38 This increases the risks an exercise might create. In 1983, NATO ran a 
nuclear command post exercise called Able Archer. Although the command post annex involved 
only a few hundred personnel, the Soviet Union responded by putting its conventional and nuclear 
forces on alert.39 Presently, Russia also runs frequent military exercises involving nuclear forces, 
including an exercise that simulated dropping nuclear weapons on Sweden.40 Since nuclear 
exercises highlight how a country may intend to use its nuclear forces and can serve as a means of 
testing nuclear strategies, nuclear exercises can appear threatening, even when an attack is not 
immediately anticipated.41 
Although the risks created by cyber and space annexes lie beyond the scope of this paper, 
military exercises involving these tools may create additional risks.42 Because cyber and space 
military exercises could have high destructive power43 and can signal hostile intentions,44 they 
likely increase the risks of a military exercise. 
Ultimately, the inclusion of nuclear, cyber, or space annexes in a military exercise can 
increase the threat level of an exercise, beyond the proximity, magnitude, and transparency 
rankings. 
 
                                                 38 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 1977). 39 Jones, Blanton, and Harper, “The 1983 War Scare Declassified and For Real.”   40 Rosen, “NATO report: A 2013 Russian aerial exercise.” 41 James T. Quinlivan, “Yes, Russia’s Military Is Getting More Aggressive,” Foreign Policy, December 30, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/30/yes-russias-military-is-getting-more-aggressive/. 42 See “Recommendations: Further Research” for additional details. 43 Richard J. Campbell, Cybersecurity Issues for the Bulk Power System (CRS Report No. R43989), (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 22-25, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43989.pdf. 44  Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence, 14. 
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Risk Matrix 
Together, we combine these two factors—the political environment and the threat level of 
the exercise—to create a Risk Matrix. This Risk 
Matrix shows the different levels of risk a military 
exercise is likely to run, based on the political 
environment within which the exercise takes place 
and the adversary-perceived threat level it creates. 
In each environment and at different levels of 
threat, different risks exist—ranging from 
accidents to crises. By understanding these two factors, a combatant commander can use this Risk 
Matrix to better understand the risks a military exercise can create. The risks are discussed in detail 
below. Should the risks be deemed unacceptable, a combatant commander can take steps to 
mitigate the risks by changing the threat level of the military exercise, which could change the 
risks that an exercise may run. The Risk Matrix provides combatant commanders a tool to evaluate 
the risks a military exercise might create through adversary responses. 
Within the Risk Matrix, exercises are first divided by the political environment. Accidents 
and hostility are the highest risks an exercise in a non-hostile environment is likely to create. 
Exercises in a hostile environment may lead to crisis or reciprocity. Exercises which present a 
medium-high threat to the adversary or higher falls in the upper category—risking hostility or 
crisis, depending on the political environment. Any exercise that presents a medium threat or lower 
falls into the lower half of the Risk Matrix—risking accidents or reciprocity. 
The Risk Matrix shows the highest risk that a military exercise is likely to create, based on 
the factors discussed above. But within each environment, a military exercise may also face 
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additional, lower level risks. For example, a highly threatening military exercise in a hostile 
political environment can risk a crisis. But it can also risk reciprocity, hostility, and accidents. This 
is because adversaries have different incentives for responding to military exercises. 
Our Risk Matrix does not offer to explain the unique causal mechanisms behind every 
adversary’s response; rather, it broadly identifies the risks an exercise is likely to run based on the 
deterministic factors of adversary behavior which a combatant commander is likely to know—the 
political environment—and is able to influence—the threat level of the exercise. Although factors 
within an adversarial state may influence its decision to respond to a threatening exercise, 
including military capabilities and political objectives in other areas, the Risk Matrix creates a 
baseline for a combatant commander to evaluate and address risk.  
Although each military exercises has the potential for realizing a risk, not every exercise 
does. In fact, the Bush School Military Exercise Dataset shows that while reciprocity is common, 
accidents, hostility, and crises are relatively rare occurrences.45 This is in part because countries 
often take care to reduce the risks of accidents and because changes to the political environment 
and military responses to military exercises are highly costly actions. Despite the high threat of a 
military exercise, an adversary may choose not to respond with such risky actions. All four risks 
deserve examination despite the rarity of occurrences, however, as the potential consequences can 
be severe. 
By analyzing the political environment in which the exercise is occurring and calculating 
the threat level of an exercise using proximity, magnitude, and transparency, a combatant 
commander can determine which risks an exercise may to create. If the risks are deemed too high, 
a combatant commander can mitigate these risks by calibrating the threat level of the exercise—
                                                 45 See “Appendix C: Overview of the Bush School Military Exercises Dataset” 
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the proximity, magnitude, or transparency. Depending on the nature of the mission, whether it is 
vital to exercise a large force to test command and control or to run exercises in a specific area 
close to the conditions in which a force might someday face combat, mitigation may be possible. 
In others, risk mitigation may not be possible without altering the mission of an exercise. In either 
case, the Risk Matrix allows a combatant commander to make a better cost-benefit analysis, 
recognizing that military exercises may create the potential for everything from accidents to actual 
crises. 
 
The Dangers of Military Exercises 
As our framework shows, in our examination of exercises spanning fifty years, we find that 
adversaries respond to military exercises in ways that create four key risks (in ascending order of 
consequence)—accidents, hostility, reciprocity, and crises. 
Through our examination of historical cases and relevant literature, we found 
misperception of intentions and motives underlies each of the risks created by military exercises. 
Military exercises create the potential for risks, because countries can never be sure of the motives 
or intentions of another country.46 This means that a country running an exercise may misperceive 
the intentions or motives of a potential adversary or the incentives an adversary has to react to a 
military exercise. An adversarial country may have incentives to respond to threatening exercises, 
either because they cannot determine the motives or intentions behind a military exercise or 
because they do understand the motives and intentions and have incentives to respond. 
Misperception, miscalculation, and accurate intelligence can all create incentives for adversaries 
to respond to military exercises. These adversarial responses create risks. 
                                                 46 Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence. 
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Particularly in adversarial relationships, military exercises can create misperception, as 
countries are already operating under hostile assumptions.47 Even when military exercises focus 
on relatively non-threatening missions such as anti-piracy, or are not directed at a specific country, 
an adversary may perceive a threat, regardless of whether or not hostile intentions or motives 
exist.48 This complicates planning for a combatant commander, as statements about the 
harmonious intent of a military exercise or its narrow focus may have little effect on the 
perceptions of that exercise to an adversary. 
 
Accidents 
As with any military maneuvers, the use of personnel and equipment during military 
exercises can lead to accidents. Many countries run provocative military exercises near other 
countries’ borders, which creates the potential for an accident in a potential adversary’s territory. 
Between 2014 and 2015, Russia and NATO countries experienced over 60 close military 
encounters that nearly resulted in accidents, many of which occurred in the context of military 
exercises.49 Adversarial countries also sometimes send surveillance equipment to survey other 
countries’ exercises. In 2014, Chinese ships spied on a U.S. exercise involving 18,000 personnel.50 
These incidents creates the potential for mid-air collisions or other military-to-military incidents. 
These accidents are particularly dangerous in the context of military exercises because they can 
                                                 47 Ibid.  48 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 121. 49 Thomas Frear, “List of Close Military Encounters Between Russia and the West, March 2014-2015” European Leadership Network, March 2015, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/medialibrary/2015/03/11/4264a5a6/ELN%20Russia%20-%20West%20Full%20List%20of%20Incidents.pdf. 50 Erik Slavin, “Chinese Ship Spies on Valiant Shield, and That's OK With US,” Stars and Stripes, September 22, 2014, http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/chinese-ship-spies-on-valiant-shield-and-that-s-ok-with-us-1.304288. 
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lead to loss of life and destruction of military equipment. An adversary or the country running the 
exercise may interpret these actions as deliberate.51 Even if an incident is recognized as an 
accident, other issues, like territorial violations, may make resolving a potential accident situation 
difficult to resolve.52  
 
Hostility 
Military exercises can also negatively impact the political environment and create hostility. 
Because adversaries may perceive an exercise to signal hostile intentions or motives, they can 
respond in ways that increase tensions and negatively affect the political environment. In 2012, 
NATO ran a large military exercise, Cold Response 2012, in Northern Norway near the Barents 
Sea.53 Despite a relatively non-hostile relationship, Russia found the NATO exercise extremely 
provocative and issued numerous public statements condemning the action.54 Although the NATO 
exercise was relatively non-threatening, Russia considered the act hostile and the political 
relationship suffered.55 This potential for misperceptions between the country running the exercise 
and the adversary can create risks for a combatant commander. A military exercise may have 
negative repercussions that lead to political tensions between the two countries. 
                                                 51 Ian Kearns, “Avoiding War in Europe: The Risks from NATO-Russian Close Military Encounters,” Arms Control Association, November 2, 2015, https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_11/Features/Avoiding-War-in-Europe-The-Risks-from-NATO-Russian-Close-Military-Encounters. 52 Although outside of the context of a military exercise, U.S. servicemen and women were held for nearly two weeks in China, following the 2001 mid-air collision of a U.S. plane and Chinese jet. Shirley A. Kan et al., China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy Implications (CRS Report No. RL30946), (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2001), 1, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30946.pdf. 53 Trude Pettersen, “15 nations take part in military exercise in Norway,” Barents Observer, March 5, 2012, http://barentsobserver.com/en/topics/15-nations-take-part-military-exercise-norway. 54 Trude Petterson, “Russian military experts: NATO exercise in Norway a provocation,” Barents Observer, March 14, 2012, http://barentsobserver.com/en/additional-menu/russian-military-experts-nato-exercise-norway-provocation. 55 Ibid. 
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Reciprocity 
Military exercises can also cause reciprocal responses, also called tit-for-tat exercises. 
Adversaries may respond to a country’s military exercise with a military exercise of their own of 
equal or greater size. This not only increases tensions between the countries; it can also lead to 
increased military competition as both sides have an incentive to respond with larger, more 
threatening military exercises.56 
Reciprocal exercises create danger in three key ways. First, in an environment of increased 
competition, the likelihood of misperception increases. Political hostility and high threat exercises 
may mask motives and intentions.57 Second, reciprocity can lead to unintended military 
competition, which can be difficult to halt and which may create insecurity.58 Potential adversaries 
may respond to this insecurity in ways that further destabilizes the situation militarily. This type 
of environment can also drain resources, incentivizing a combatant commander’s to respond with 
large, resource intensive exercises. 
Third, reciprocity can lead to instability, as the frequency and magnitude of military 
exercises increases. Incentives may exist for countries to run more threatening exercises.  
Countries may increase the magnitude of an exercise and the proximity to the potential adversary’s 
border. Additionally, in a reciprocal environment, a country may feel incentivized to respond to a 
military exercise with snap exercises, in which no notice of the exercise is given. Such exercises 
create additional risks, because they are non-transparent. 
                                                 56 Brzezinksi and Varangis, “The NATO-Russia Exercise Gap.” 57 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics. 58 In addition to an increase in military exercises in Europe, since 2014 there has been a marked increase in the number of close military encounters between NATO countries and Russia, including 400 interceptions of Russian warplanes and narrowly avoided collisions between Russian planes and commercial airliners. See Ian Kearns, Lukasz Kulesa, and Thomas Frear, “Russia – Dangerous Brinkmanship Continues,” European Leadership Network, March 12 2015, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/russia--west-dangerous-brinkmanship-continues-_2529.html. 
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Ultimately, reciprocity can increase the potential for military competition and escalation. 
This is especially troubling for a combatant commander when it creates an environment in which 
an adversary frequently mobilizes troops in threatening ways, with little notice or accountability. 
Because such exercises may mimic or mask invasion forces, reciprocal military exercises can 
contribute to the fourth risk—crisis.59 
 
Crisis 
Lastly, and most alarming, military exercises may create crisis situations. Because military 
exercises can signal hostile intentions and motives60 and can mask invasion movements,61 an 
adversarial country has an incentive to respond to threatening military exercises in a forceful 
manner if they perceive a real threat or a potential gain from their response. This threat is most 
acute when the political relationship is already strained or openly hostile.62 In the past fifty years, 
military exercises have led potential adversaries to put their military forces on alert or to respond 
to threatening exercises near border regions by mobilizing troops.63 In some cases, these actions 
resulted in border skirmishes.64 In the extreme, military exercises could potentially contribute to 
the start of a war. 
                                                 59 Betts, Surprise Attack, 205-206. 60 Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence, 1. 61 Betts, Surprise Attack, 205-206. 62 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics. 63 In 1983, Russian conventional and nuclear forces were placed on alert following a NATO command post nuclear exercise. See Nate Jones, Tom Blanton, and Lauren Harper, eds., “The 1983 War Scare Declassified and For Real,” in National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 533 (Washington D.C.: George Washington University, 2015), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb533-The-Able-Archer-War-Scare-Declassified-PFIAB-Report-Released/.  64 In 1986, Pakistan responded to India’s threatening Exercise Brasstacks by moving troops to the border. Eventually skirmishes broke out between the two countries. See Kanti P. Bajpai, Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia (New Dehli: Manohar, 1997), 170-174. 
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The threat of crises is twofold. Crises can arise out of misperception. If an adversary 
believes that a military exercise threatens its security or interests the adversary has an incentive to 
respond, even if the exercise is not intended to signal such intentions.65 Crises can also occur 
because of cost-benefit analyses of potential future conflict. Military exercises may build 
capabilities for future wars against a specific adversary and can send specific deterrence messages 
to an adversary. A potential adversary watching a military modernization program may have 
incentives to react now, rather than later, if they believe that such actions are necessary for their 
interests.66 This distinction is important for U.S. combatant commanders when considering 
military exercises in the future. Regardless of how accurately an adversary interprets the intent or 
motives behind a military exercise, they may still react in ways that create unintended 
consequences. 
 
Escalation 
While accidents, hostility, reciprocity, and crises present their own dangers, military 
exercises can also create risks because the effects of military exercises can combine, leading to 
escalation. As a country responds to a military exercise, the potential adversary may also have an 
incentive to respond in more dangerous ways. These countries may become trapped in negative 
spirals of hostility and reciprocity. Under these conditions, the potential for a crisis increases. The 
current level of increasingly large, frequent military exercises in Europe reflects these dangers. 
When planning military exercises, a combatant commander must consider the broader implications 
of military exercises, as they do not occur in a vacuum. 
                                                 65  Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence. 66 Richard Ned Lebow, “Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?” International Security 9, no. 1 (1984), 181-186. 
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The increasing tempo of NATO and Russian military exercises in Europe illustrates how 
the risks of a singular military exercise can combine. For the past decade, NATO-Russia relations 
have been on a volatile, negative trajectory. In recent years, the situation has only worsened.67 As 
the political environment has deteriorated, 
military competition between Russia and the 
West has entered an increasingly dangerous 
spiral of reciprocity. 68 As “Figure 1” shows, the 
frequency of NATO and Russian exercises has 
increased in the past two years. To reassure 
allies in Europe, NATO performed 162 exercise 
events in 2014 and participated in 40 national 
exercises in the region.69 This was double the originally planned exercises.70 NATO further 
increased its involvement in Europe in 2015, conducting and participating in nearly 300 military 
exercises.71 By comparison, Russia’s Ministry of Defense planned 4,000 military events in 2015.72 
As Figure 2 shows, the magnitude and intensity of Russia’s military exercises has also increased 
at an alarming rate. Russia has held more than 18 large-scale, snap exercises in the past three 
                                                 67 At the end of 2012, Russia expelled the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). See Natasha Abbakumova and Kathy Lally, “Russia boots out USAID,” The Washington Post, September 18, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-boots-out-usaid/2012/09/18/c2d185a8-01bc-11e2-b260-32f4a8db9b7e_story.html. Russia also harbored Edward Snowden and supported the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad, both against U.S. wishes. The U.S.-Russian relationship hit its nadir with the Russian invasion and subsequent annexation of Crimea and the continuing crisis in Ukraine. See John Simpson, “Russia’s Crimea plan detailed, secret and successful,” BBC News, Macrh 19, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26644082. 68 See Brzezinksi and Varangis, “The NATO-Russia Exercise Gap” and “Appendix C: Overview of the Bush School Database.” 69 NATO, The Secretary General’s Annual Report, 2014.  70 Ibid. 71 Ibid 72 See Bodner. “Russia Launches Largest Military Maneuvers of 2015” and Frear, Kearns, and Kulesa, “Preparing for the Worst.” 
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years.73 Some included more than 100,000 
personnel. Many of these large scale snap 
exercises occurred close to the border, creating 
the potential for risky NATO responses. 
Additionally, since Russia has used these types 
of military maneuvers in the past to mask 
invasion, these exercises are especially 
concerning.74  Several Russian exercises have 
also included nuclear components, which creates additional danger.75 In the complex European 
theater, political action, reciprocal military exercises, and military maneuvers all work to create 
incentives for increasingly risky responses. 
As the current NATO-Russian exercise tempo shows, while singular military exercises 
create risk, the combined effects of military exercises can compounded dangers. Reciprocal 
responses to military exercises creates a particularly dangerous situation. As the political situation 
becomes more hostile, exercises appear more threatening, and countries have greater incentives to 
react in risky ways, which may lead to crises in the future. 
 
Historical Case Studies 
To test the plausibility and utility of our analytical framework, we selected several military 
exercises from the Bush School Military Exercise Dataset. By analyzing historical case studies on 
                                                 73 NATO, The Secretary General’s Annual Report, 2015. 74 Russia has been accused of using exercises to mask invasions into Georgia (2008) and Crimea (2014). See Whitmore, “Did Russia Plan Its War In Georgia?” and Brzezinksi and Varangis, “The NATO-Russia Exercise Gap.” 75 Armin Rosen, “NATO report: A 2013 Russian aerial exercise was actually a 'simulated nuclear attack' on Sweden,” Business Insider, February 3, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/nato-report-russia-sweden-nuclear-2016-2. 
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exercises that resulted in unanticipated consequences, we are able to test our analytical framework 
and highlight the causal mechanisms by which military exercises create risk. These cases further 
show how a combatant commander might utilize our Risk Matrix to evaluate and reduce risk. 
These historical case studies illustrate the risks military exercises create, highlight the credibility 
of our analytical framework, and provide an avenue to discuss risk mitigation strategies for a 
combatant commander. 
This selection of case studies is not meant to be representative or exhaustive. Of the 200 
cases in the Bush School Military Exercise Dataset, we selected eight military exercises for in-
depth case studies. We chose these cases because they resulted in a negative outcome. By selecting 
on the extremes, we clearly show how military exercises created and contributed to risk. Additional 
case studies are included in “Appendix B: Additional Case Studies” and a broader selection of 
military exercises may be found in “Appendix C: Overview of the Bush School Military Exercise 
Dataset.” Additionally, while our Risk Matrix identifies the risks that a military exercise could run, 
the particular circumstances that lead to risk realization will differ from case to case. Our historical 
case studies show that while these circumstances matter, the political environment and the exercise 
threat level captured in our analytical framework accurately predicts the risks military exercises 
can create. 
 
Accident: Hainan Island Incident, 2001 
In 2001, a Chinese spy plane and a U.S. 
surveillance plane collided in mid-air near Hainan 
Island, China, when a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
fighter pilot executed a close pass of the U.S. EP-3 
Hainan Island Incident Ranking 
Political Environment Non-hostile 
Proximity High 
Magnitude Low 
Transparency Low 
Composite Threat Score Medium 
Predicted Risk Accidents 
Outcome None 
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reconnaissance plane.76 Although the Hainan Island incident occurred outside of the bounds of a 
military exercise, the case highlights the potential for accidents and the possible repercussion 
between a country and an adversary. A similar scenario, under the auspices of a military exercise, 
could be even more dangerous, because military exercises can simulate wartime conditions. 
Based on the political environment at the time 
and the threat level of the exercise, the Hainan Island 
incident would have risked an accident, had it occurred 
during an exercise. At the time of the incident, relations 
between China and the U.S. were non-hostile, although 
the U.S. was in the process of a U.S.-Taiwanese arms 
sale.77 The proximity of the exercise was high, as it occurred in near China. However, the 
magnitude was low, involving only one Chinese jet and one U.S. reconnaissance plane.78 
Despite the relatively low threat of the incident, China reacted very strongly—holding the 
EP-3 crew for 11 days. The U.S. was forced to apologize in the aftermath, while China demanded 
an end to U.S. spy flights off its coast.79 At that point, both the U.S. and China worked to reduce 
tensions.80 
While the Hainan Island incident in 2001 occurred outside of the context of an exercise, 
the incident shows how an accident could happen and how the adversarial response could create 
                                                 76 Kan, et al., “China-U.S. Aircraft Collision.” 77 Elisabeth Rosenthal and David E. Sanger, U.S. Plane in China After It Collides with Chinese Jet,” New York Times, April 2, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/02/world/us-plane-in-china-after-it-collides-with-chinese-jet.html?pagewanted=all. 78 Ibid. 79 Paul Eckert, “Dismantled U.S. spy plane flown out of China,” ABC News, July 3, 2001, http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=80826&page=1. 80 Ibid. 
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additional repercussions. Given that an exercise might involve a much higher threat activity and 
could take place in a hostile political environment, military planners must be cognizant that 
accidents are always possible, either caused by adversary responses or through personnel and 
equipment errors. Recent provocations and unsafe maneuvers during U.S. and NATO exercises by 
Russia in the Baltic Sea and China in the Pacific highlight this risk.81 
 
Hostility: Steadfast Jazz 2013 
In 2013, NATO ran Steadfast Jazz, one of the 
largest military exercises since the end of the Cold War, 
along Russia’s border.84 The high threat exercise created 
hostility and contributed to a negative downturn in the 
political relationship between the U.S. and Russia. 
When Steadfast Jazz 2013 was announced in 2011 under NATO’s traditional two year 
notice of military exercises, the political environment between the U.S. and Russia was non-
hostile. Although the 2008 Russo-Georgian War had briefly turned relations hostile, the Obama 
administration presided over a “Russian reset” in 2009.85 The U.S. and Russia had significant issue 
cooperation on counter-terrorism, which included Russia allowing NATO to supply troops in 
                                                 81 See Erik Slavin, “Chinese ship spies on Valient Shield - and that’s OK with US,” Stars and Stripes, September 22, 2014, http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/chinese-ship-spies-on-valiant-shield-and-that-s-ok-with-us-1.304288. See Frear, “List of Close Military Encounters.” 82 See the “Bush School Military Exercises Dataset” for specific coding. 83 The relationship was non-hostile when the exercise was announced. This changed in 2013. See “Appendix A: Variable Explanations” for further details on the political environment.  84 “NATO’s Steadfast Jazz exercise gets underway,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 2, 2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_104648.htm. 85 Maxwell Tani, “Hillary Clinton just made two statements to boost her foreign policy credentials - and one is iffy,” Business Insider, June 14, 2015,  http://www.businessinsider.com/hillary-clinton--russia-and-the-reset-2015-6. 
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Afghanistan through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN).86 The two countries had also 
recently run a joint anti-hijacking exercise87 and signed the New START treaty on nuclear arms 
control.88 Discussions on joint sanctions against Iran were also underway.89 Although there were 
areas of contention, the relationship was non-hostile when NATO announced Steadfast Jazz 2013. 
In 2012, after Steadfast Jazz 2013’s announcement, the relationship began to deteriorate. Russia 
began air zone incursions on nearby countries, including NATO partners.90 President Obama 
signed the Magnitsky Act, which targeted human rights abusers in Russia.91 In response, Putin 
signed a bill to ban U.S. citizens from adopting Russian children.92 In the midst of the worsening 
relationship, NATO held Steadfast Jazz 2013. 
Steadfast Jazz 2013 was a medium-high threat 
exercise. During the exercise, NATO and partner 
countries exercised forces in Poland and the Baltic 
states, all within a short distance of the Russian border.93 
Over 6,000 personnel took part in the exercise, which 
tested the NATO Response Force (NRF).94 NRF’s 
                                                 86 Andrew Kuchins and Tom Sanderson, “Northern Distribution Network,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, http://csis.org/program/northern-distribution-network-ndn. 87 “Vigilant Eagle 2010- protection against aircraft terrorism,” Sputnik News, August 14, 2010, http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/2010/08/14/15771719.html. 88 “New START,” U.S. Department of State, April 21, 2016,  http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/index.htm. 89 “Citing Iran’s failure to clarify nuclear ambitions, UN imposes additional sanctions,” United Nations News Centre, June 9, 2010, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=34970. 90 Bill Gertz, “False START,” The Washington Free Beacon, July 19, 2012, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/false-start/. 91 “Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Accountability Act of 2012,” US Treasury, December 14, 2012, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/pl112_208.pdf. 92 David M. Herszenhorn and Erik Eckholm, “Putin Signs Bill that Bars U.S. Adoptions, Upending Families,” The New York Times, December 27, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/28/world/europe/putin-to-sign-ban-on-us-adoptions-of-russian-children.html?_r=0. 93 “NATO’s Steadfast Jazz exercise gets underway.” 94 Ibid. 
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mission is specifically to respond to Article V aggression, which led some to believe the exercise 
was targeted at Russia.95 Standard two year notification was given, but Russia did not participate 
in the exercise. Based on the location, magnitude, and transparency, Steadfast Jazz 2013 was 
threatening to Russia. 
Because of the non-hostile political environment at the time the exercise was announced 
and the high threat nature of the exercise, Steadfast Jazz risked hostility. In response to Steadfast 
Jazz 2013, Russia heavily protested the exercise. A defense ministry accusing the exercise of 
“having the chill of the Cold War.”96 Although determining whether an exercise contributes to a 
hostile turn of relations or is a leading indicator of such a turn is difficult, the official Russian 
protests of the exercise make it clear that Steadfast Jazz increased hostility between the U.S. and 
Russia. 
If a combatant commander wished to mitigate the risk of Steadfast Jazz 2013 creating 
hostility, he or she could have done several things differently. The force could have been exercised 
outside of Russia’s border regions to reduce the perceived threat of the exercise. NATO’s Trident 
Juncture 2015 had a significantly greater magnitude, but was held at a distance in Spain and 
Portugal.97 To lower the magnitude of the exercise, forces could have been exercised at different 
times. Finally, Russian participation would have increased transparency and might have decreased 
the risk, though such an action may have been unfeasible due to operational secrecy. 
Ultimately, Steadfast Jazz 2013 contributed to a negative downturn in the political 
relationship between the U.S. and Russia, as evidenced by the worsening relationship between the 
                                                 95 Ibid. 96Andrei Akulov, “NATO Steadfast Jazz Exercise - Chill of Cold War,” Strategic Culture Foundation Online Journal, October 17, 2013,  http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2013/10/17/nato-steadfast-jazz-exercise-chill-of-cold-war.html. 97 Nicholas Fiorenza, “NATO’s Trident Juncture Exercise Ends on Positive Note,” Aviation Week Network, November 6, 2015, http://aviationweek.com/blog/natos-trident-juncture-exercise-ends-positive-note. 
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announcement of the exercise and its occurrence, as well as the hostile political statements given 
by the Russian government about the exercise. This exercise highlights that even in a non-hostile 
environment, hostility can occur if an exercise appears threatening. 
 
Reciprocity: Immediate Response 2008 
In 2008, the U.S. ran Immediate Response 
2008, a counterterrorism exercise in Georgia that 
resulted in reciprocity. In response, Russia ran Kavkaz 
2008, an exercise of even greater magnitude.99 
Immediate Response 2008 and the reciprocal Kavkaz 
2008 demonstrate how military exercises can create spirals of reciprocity. 
In 2008, the political environment between the US and Russia was hostile. This hostile 
relationship began in 2003 with the accession of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia into NATO. The 
relationship further deteriorated when Russia suspended 
its participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe (CFE) in 2007. Additionally, at the 
same time, Bulgaria and Romania joined the European 
Union (EU) and Georgia entered talks to become a 
NATO member. In response to NATO expansion, 
Russia threatened to recognize Georgia’s autonomous 
regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as an attempt to deter Georgia from pursuing NATO 
                                                 98 See the “Bush School Military Exercises Dataset” for specific coding. 99 C. W. Blandy, “Provocation, Deception, Entrapment: The Russo-Georgian Five-Day War,” Advanced Research and Assessment Group, March 2009, http://www.conflictstudies.org.uk/files/04.pdf . 
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membership. Throughout 2007 and 2008, Russia also strengthened trade ties with Georgia’s 
autonomous regions and increased its peacekeeper presence in the area.100 
In the midst of this hostile political relationship, the U.S. ran Immediate Response 2008 
with Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries, including Georgia. In previous years, the exercise had 
been held in Bulgaria and Poland. The 2008 variant, held from July 15 to July 31, was run in 
Georgia, at a base approximately 30km east of Tbilisi. With 2,000 personnel operating both ground 
and air forces, the size of the exercise was moderately threatening, causing it to risk reciprocity.102 
Although Immediate Response 2008 was only a 
moderately threatening exercise, it nonetheless elicited 
an aggressive Russian military exercise—Kavkaz 2008. 
Kavkaz 2008 was held in the Russo-Georgian border 
regions, and began on July 15—the same day as 
Immediate Response 2008.103 The exercise officially consisted of 8,000 Russian troops, but with 
permanent readiness forces stationed in the Chechen region, the real force size was over 23,000 
servicemen.104 Kavkaz 2008 was comprised of both air and ground forces that spanned the entire 
Russo-Georgian border, with a focus on important mountain passes.105 The exercise was planned 
on short notice and Russia did not invite international observers. 106 The large magnitude, close 
                                                 100 George Friedman, “The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power,” Stratfor, 12 August 2008, https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russo_georgian_war_and_balance_power. 101 See the “Bush School Military Exercises Dataset” for specific coding. 102 David Mdzinarishvili, “US Troops Start Training Exercise in Georgia,” Reuters, 15 July 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-usa-exercises-idUSL1556589920080715. 103 Blandy, “Provocation, Deception, Entrapment.” 104 Ibid.  105 Ibid.  106 Following Kavkaz 2008, Russia invaded South Ossetia, using troops that were in theater for the exercise, which highlights how military exercises can be used to mask troop movements. In contrast, Russia has claimed that the Georgians used Immediate Response as training for an immediate invasion of the South Ossetia region. See Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russian Military Chief Accuses Georgia of Preparing Aggression,” Jamestown Foundation, 18 June 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35140&no_cache=1#.VyZYfTArLIU.  
Kavkaz 2008 Ranking101 
Political Environment Hostile 
Proximity High 
Magnitude Medium-High 
Transparency Low 
Composite Threat Score High 
Predicted Risk Crisis 
Outcome Crisis 
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proximity, and lack of transparency made the exercise highly threatening. As a response to 
Immediate Response 2008, Kavkaz 2008 was disproportionally threatening, highlighting the 
dangers of reciprocity. 
To mitigate the potential for reciprocity caused by Immediate Response 2008, a combatant 
commander could have held Immediate Response 2008 
in another region. The Georgian situation was already 
deteriorating by the time of the exercise and previous 
iterations of the exercise had been conducted in other 
countries. By recognizing the hostile environment, a 
combatant commander might have been able to forestall 
a Russian response.107 
Given the deteriorating political relationship between the U.S. and Russia and the very 
hostile Russo-Georgian relationship, Immediate Response was threatening, as it occurred in a 
border region where Russian troops were already stationed. Immediate Response 2008 and the 
reciprocal Kavkaz 2008 are prime examples of how an exercise can lead to increasingly dangerous 
responses from an adversary. 
 
Crisis: Able Archer 1983 
In 1983, NATO ran Able Archer, a command 
post nuclear exercise as part of its larger Autumn Forge 
                                                 107 Ibid. 108 See the “Bush School Military Exercises Dataset” for specific coding. 
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exercise.109 In response to the nuclear exercise, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact members placed 
their nuclear and conventional forces on alert.110 The situation was only resolved because NATO 
chose not to elevate its own alerts system and because both Russia and NATO took diplomatic 
actions.111 This exercise highlights how a crisis can occur because of a military exercise. 
The political relationship between NATO and 
Warsaw Pact members was extremely hostile prior to 
Able Archer. In March 1983, President Reagan had 
personally introduced the Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI), which Soviet leaders found highly threatening.112 
In late 1983, Soviet pilots accidentally shot down 
Korean Airlines Flight 007 over the Sea of Japan, killing 
269 civilians.113 At the same time, NATO also deployed a new generation of intermediate-range 
nuclear missiles (IRBM) in Western Europe, causing Soviet negotiators to walk out of arms control 
talks in Geneva.114 And in the two months before Able Archer was held, the Soviet Union’s nuclear 
warning system malfunctioned, detecting ICBM launches from the U.S., which turned out to be 
false.115 When Able Archer began in November of 1983, the situation was hostile. 
                                                 109 David E. Hoffman, “In 1983 ‘war scare,’ Soviet leadership feared nuclear surprise attack by U.S.,” The Washington Post, October 24, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-1983-war-scare-soviet-leadership-feared-nuclear-surprise-attack-by-us/2015/10/24/15a289b4-7904-11e5-a958-d889faf561dc_story.html  110 Jones, Blanton, and Harper, eds., “The 1983 War Scare Declassified” 111 Ibid. 112 Benjamin B. Fischer, “The Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare,” Central Intelligence Agency Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008, accessed May 1, 2016,   https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/a-cold-war-conundrum/source.htm#HEADING1-12  113 Ibid. 114 Hoffman, “In 1983 ‘war scare,’ Soviet leadership feared nuclear surprise attack by U.S.” 115 Jones, Blanton and Harper, “The 1983 War Scare Declassified and for Real.” 
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In 1983, NATO ran its annual Autumn Forge exercise.116 Roughly 80,000 troops 
participated, with all arms and headquarters integration.117 As a yearly NATO exercise, Autumn 
Forge tested the U.S. and NATO’s ability to defend the Fulda Gap and to reinforce the continent.118  
In the exercise, as U.S. follow on forces entered the theater, nuclear weapons were factored into 
the exercise, to prevent NATO forces from being overrun.119 Additionally in 1983, the nuclear 
annex was changed to include high level participation by high level officials, including President 
R. Reagan. The exercise also used the communications equipment needed to release nuclear 
weapons in the event of a nuclear exchange.120 Weapons facilities themselves also participated, 
with a simulated release of weapons.121 The magnitude of Autumn Forge and the inclusion of 
nuclear weapons contributed to the high threat level of the exercise. 
The location and transparency of the exercise were also very threatening. NATO and U.S. 
troops were practicing along the inner-German border, in areas where actual fighting was planned 
to take place in the event of hostilities.122 While standard notification was given for the overarching 
Autumn Forge exercise, NATO forces left out key information on the expanded nuclear annex, 
increasing the potential for misunderstandings.123 This proximity and lack of transparency in Able 
Archer, as well as the high threat posed by nuclear involvement made the exercise very threatening. 
                                                 116 Douglas Birch, “The U.S.S.R. and U.S. Came Closer to Nuclear War Than We Thought,” The Atlantic, May 28, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/05/the-ussr-and-us-came-closer-to-nuclear-war-than-we-thought/276290/  117 Jamie Doward, “How a NATO war game took the world to brink of nuclear disaster,” The Guardian, November 2, 2013,  http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/02/nato-war-game-nuclear-disaster 118 Anne Applebaum, “Should NATO renew REFORGER exercises?” Atlantic Council, November 23, 2010, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/should-nato-renew-reforger-exercises  119 Hoffman, “In 1983 ‘war scare,’ Soviet leadership feared nuclear surprise attack by U.S.”  120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. 122 “Reforger,” Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/reforger.htm  123  Birch, “The U.S.S.R. and U.S. Came Closer to Nuclear War Than We Thought.” 
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Because of the hostile relationship and the very high threat exercise, Able Archer risked a 
crisis. In fact, the Soviet Union responded by putting air formations in East Germany and Poland 
on high alert.124 Soviet nuclear forces were also readied, with ICBMs prepared for launch.125 After 
the CIA reported nuclear preparations on the Soviet side, Reagan decided not to participate and 
cancelled the exercise, resolving the situation.126 
To mitigate the potential risks of Able Archer, NATO could have taken steps to lower the 
threat level of the exercise or could have altered the timing of the exercise to seem less threatening. 
Increased transparency would have likely helped assuage Soviet fears of a NATO first strike. 
Likewise, separating the Able Archer exercise from the larger Autumn Forge exercise might have 
reduced the threat level, since the conventional forces bolstered fears of military action.127 And 
lastly, NATO could have reduced risk by altering the timing of the exercise. In 1983, the NATO-
Soviet relationship was particularly hostile. If NATO had waited several months, the threat level 
of the exercise may have been reduced. 
Ultimately, because of the political environment and Able Archer’s nuclear annex, as well 
as the magnitude, proximity, and transparency of the exercise and the overarching Autumn Forge 
exercise, Able Archer precipitated a crisis situation between NATO and the Soviet Union.  
 
Recommendations 
Given the potential risks of military exercises and the increasing tempo of exercises in 
Europe, combatant commanders should pay increased attention to the risks military exercises pose. 
Recognizing the risks specific exercises can cause allows a combatant commander to make better 
                                                 124 Ibid. 125 Doward, “How a NATO war game took the world to brink of nuclear disaster.” 126 Hoffman, “In 1983 ‘war scare,’ Soviet leadership feared nuclear surprise attack by U.S.” 127 Ibid. 
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cost-benefit analyses. In some scenarios, when a combatant commander desires to run exercises to 
build capabilities, reassure allies, or to deter adversaries, the benefits may outweigh the potential 
costs. However, if the risks a military exercise could create are too high, a combatant commander 
can mitigate the risks of military exercises by recognizing how threatening an exercise is and 
calibrating exercises to avoid these risks. By devoting more attention to the political environment, 
the threat level of an exercise, and the dangers of military exercises, combatant commanders can 
better anticipate the risks a military exercise may create. 
 
Consider the Political Environment 
A combatant commander planning a military exercise should analyze the political 
relationship between the countries running the exercise and the adversary, because the political 
environment influences the ways in which an adversary is likely to respond to a military exercise. 
Although a combatant commander cannot alter the political environment, it contributes to the risk 
an exercise presents. Additional and time dependent factors in the political environment can lead 
to increased tension, which increases misperception.  
In many risk cases, changes in the political environment influenced the probability that an 
adversary would respond in a way that created risk. For example, while Able Archer was a high 
threat exercise due to the inclusion of nuclear forces, the political environment contributed to the 
Soviet response and created increased potential for misperception,128 making it seem possible that 
the U.S. might be considering nuclear use. 
                                                 128 Prior to Able Archer, the USSR was responsible for the downing Korean Airliner 007. The USSR’s nuclear warning system had falsely detected Minutemen missiles. This created a hostile political environment. See Vojtech Mastny, “How Able was ‘Able Archer’?: Nuclear Trigger and Intelligence in Perspective,” Journal of Cold War Studies 11 (2009): 117-118, accessed April 30, 2016, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/259186. 
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Although a combatant commander cannot control the political environment in the run-up 
to a military exercise, military planners should analyze the political environment to better consider 
how an adversary may view a military exercise and to more accurately predict the potential risks 
an exercise may run. 
 
Recognize the Potential for Misperception and Misunderstandings 
Military exercises can appear threatening and can create misperception, even when they 
are not directed against a specific target or when the intention of the exercise is unrelated to the 
adversary. Because of this, a combatant commander should recognize that even low threat 
exercises can lead to risks, because an adversary may have unanticipated incentives to respond. 
Often, countries underestimate the potential for misperception—incorrectly assuming that their 
signaling will be understood.129 A combatant commander should attempt to discern how 
threatening a military exercise may appear to the adversary. Our framework provides one way to 
examine the threat level by focusing on the magnitude, proximity, and transparency of the exercise. 
By determining the threat an exercise may create, the combatant commander can decide 
whether or not risk mitigation strategies are necessary to reduce the potential dangers of a military 
exercise. In some cases, the potential costs posed by a risk may be outweighed by the benefits of 
running the exercise—mission specific training, allied reassurance, or deterrence. In other cases, 
after recognizing the threat level an exercise, a combatant commander may wish to alter the risks 
an exercise creates. This can be done by calibrating the threat level of the exercise—the one area 
that the combatant commander has control over. 
 
                                                 129 Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions. 
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Calibrate Exercises to Reduce Risk 
If the dangers an exercise creates are deemed too high, a combatant commander can best 
mitigate these adversary-created risks by calibrating the threat level of the exercise—the 
proximity, magnitude, and transparency. Changing the location, reducing the number or type of 
personnel involved, and increasing transparency all provide avenues to mitigate risk. As our 
dataset, framework, and historical case studies show, military exercises which are close, large, and 
non-transparent increase the perceived threat level of the exercise, because adversaries may 
misperceive the intentions or motives behind the exercise and because military exercises can mask 
troop movements in the lead up to a war. 
To lower this threat, a military exercise could be moved further from the border. For 
example, the biennial Norwegian and NATO exercise Cold Response, has been relocated in the 
past to reduce the threat level of the exercise. In 2010, 2012, and 2014, Cold Response was held 
within the Arctic region in northern Norway and came within 100 miles of the Russian border.130 
This close proximity created a high threat level to Russia. Russia responded with a series of snap 
exercises in 2015 at multiple locations inside the Arctic Circle.131 In 2016, Cold Response was 
moved out of the Arctic Circle and into central Norway, which lowered the threat level of the 
exercise.132 The exercise, held in February, did not lead to an immediate outcome from Russia. By 
moving Cold Response 2016 to a less threatening proximity, Norway and NATO were able to 
decrease the overall threat level of the exercise. 
                                                 130 Trude Petterson, “Cold Response Moves Out of the Arctic,” Barents Observer (February 16, 2016) http://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/2016/02/cold-response-moves-out-arctic.; See “Appendix C: Overview of the Bush School Military Exercises Dataset.” 131 Ibid. 132 Ibid. 
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A combatant commander could also decrease the number of troops involved or alter the 
type of forces to reduce risk. In the past the magnitude of Cold Response has been calibrated to 
reduce the size of the force and to lower the threat level of the exercise. In 2007, Cold Response 
exercised 10,000 troops, but in the aftermath of the Russo-Georgian War, NATO scaled the 
exercise down to 7,500 personnel in 2009.133 By altering the magnitude, the exercise was made to 
appear less provocative. 
And lastly, a combatant commander can also increase transparency to better communicate 
intentions and motives. Altering transparency has less utility in risk mitigation than changing the 
proximity of an exercise or the magnitude because many countries, including the U.S. and NATO, 
currently offer a standard notice of greater than a year prior to running an exercise. Because this 
level of transparency is expected, providing notice of an exercise does not change the threat level 
of exercise. Altering transparency only decreases the threat level of an exercise if an adversary is 
invited on to participate in the exercise or if the exercise was non-transparent—if the exercise is 
concealed or no notice of the exercise was given—and transparency was introduced. 
The highly threatening nature of non-transparent exercises is a function of two issues. One, 
close and large military exercises are threatening. They can signal a country is planning a military 
engagement with the adversary, whether in the future by building capabilities, or immediately, 
through the threat of a surprise attack. Two, non-transparent exercises increase the potential for 
misperception and signal hostility, because they are designed to mask intentions and motives. For 
a combatant commander considering or viewing non-transparent exercises, this is of concern. By 
                                                 133 “Exercise Cold Response: NATO hold large, multinational exercise in Scandinavia,” Global Research , March 3, 2009), http://www.globalresearch.ca/exercise-cold-response-nato-holds-large-scale-multinational-exercise-in-scandinavia/12524  
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adopting these risk mitigation strategies, a combatant commander can decrease the threat level of 
an exercise, potentially changing the risks an exercise creates. 
 
Conduct Further Research 
Although our research has shown that military exercises create risk, further research into 
the subject is also necessary. Our dataset provides only a narrow sample of large military exercises 
for which public information is available. Additional research should consider expanding the 
dataset to look at smaller military exercises. Many exercises are held at the regiment level, which 
falls below our personnel threshold. This may lead to an underestimation of the risks, because 
small military exercises can still be threatening if held at close proximity. Additional research 
could also investigate the dangers arising from cyber, 134 space,135 and nuclear exercises, as these 
may present unanticipated risks. Lastly, future research could chart the long-term effects of 
military exercises on political relations. Although we examine the effects of military exercises on 
                                                 134 Although no numbers exist on the number of cyber military exercises run every year, the U.S. and NATO have both executed cyber annexes to military exercises. Since 2012, Estonia has thrice hosted NATO defensive cyber exercises, which involved 35 NATO allied and partner nations. See “Cyber Exercise Challenges Defence,” NATO: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, November 20, 2015, https://www.shape.nato.int/cyber-exercise-challenges-defense; Michael J. Gilmore, “FY 2015 Annual Report,” Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, January 2016, 389-396, http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2015/pdf/other/2015cybersecurity.pdf; “The Secretary General’s Annual Report, 2015” 23. For general background on the potential for misperception in cyberattacks, see Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 76-77. 135 Space military exercises can involve everything from exercises with space-missile defense programs to exercises that simulate shooting down satellites. Certain types of communications exercises may be categorized as space exercises. See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Space Operations, Joint Publication 3-14, (Washington DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff: May 29, 2013), II-1-II-10. The threat of space exercises is increased because such attacks can threaten international norms. Chinese military exercises have involved shooting down inoperable Chinese satellites. See Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence, 14; Forrest E. Morgan, Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary Assessment (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010), 42-44; Bill Gertz, “Stratcom: China Continuing to Weaponize Space with Latest Anti-Satellite Missile Shot,” The Washington Free Beacon, August 13, 2014, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/stratcom-china-continuing-to-weaponize-space-with-latest-anti-satellite-missile-shot/. 
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the U.S.-Russian relationship, further research may reveal ways in which the political relationship 
interacts with the threat level of an exercise over time in a country-dependent way. 
 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, we find that military exercises can create risks, because such exercises can 
threaten adversaries and because countries running exercises may misperceive the incentives an 
adversary has to respond. Exercises can be used to build capabilities, reassure allies, deter 
adversaries, and mask invasion preparations, each of which may appear threatening to a potential 
adversary. Because of this, exercises can cause accidents, hostility, reciprocity, and crises, 
depending on the political environment in which they occur and the adversary-perceived threat 
level the exercise creates. Given the number of exercises the U.S. and NATO run every year, these 
risks are of concern. 
Our analytical framework offers one way to evaluate the risks of a military exercise. By 
recognizing the risks of military exercises and altering the threat level of an exercise, a combatant 
commander can mitigate the potential risks an exercise may create. While altering the proximity, 
magnitude, or transparency of an exercise is not always feasible, these strategies can reduce risk. 
Additionally, by understanding the political environment and the threat level of an exercise, a 
combatant commander can make a more informed cost-benefit analysis of a military exercise, 
deciding if the potential benefits from building capabilities, reassuring allies, or deterring enemies 
is sufficient to run certain risks. 
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Appendix A: Variable Explanations 
Proximity 
We code proximity based on how close an exercise is to an adversary’s border or to its 
spheres of influence. Although this measure does introduce some ambiguity, as it is not calculated 
using a mileage threshold from the border, it recognizes adversaries have different interests. In 
particular, a strict miles/kilometers threshold is inappropriate, as smaller countries may have a 
more acute sense of threat from nearby exercises, while larger countries may expect their influence 
to expand over a greater area. 
 
Proximity Threat Level 
Within 100 miles of the border136 High (3) 
Traditional areas of influence Medium (2) 
At distance Low (1) 
 
When Russia is the potential adversary, 
we code high threat proximity if an exercise is 
located in a country sharing a border with Russia 
or an exercise in the Arctic region. A medium 
threat proximity exercise is any exercise in the 
former Soviet Union or within its former sphere 
of influence. A low threat proximity case includes 
all other areas. “Figure 3” shows these divisions in Europe.  
                                                 136 Because exact information on locations is often unavailable, we code an exercise as having high threat proximity if it takes place in a border country. 
Figure 3: Increasing Magnitude Data Source: The Bush School 
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When China is the potential adversary, 
we code proximity using a similar mechanism, 
but also introduce a naval-specific mechanism to 
account for the frequent naval exercises in the 
region. A high threat proximity exercise is one 
held in the first island chain, medium threat 
proximity exercises are held within the second 
island chain, South Korea, Japan or Southeast 
Asia, and low threat includes all exercises 
located beyond the second island chain. “Figure 4” shows the divisions for naval exercises. 
 
Magnitude 
Magnitude is a composite variable, based on force size, percentage increase between 
exercise years, and force mix. The three variables are individually calculated and then we calculate 
the overall magnitude score based on an average of the three scores. 
 
Percentage Increase 
Evidence from our research demonstrates that if an exercise experiences a significant 
increase in magnitude from one year to the next, the adversary is likely to perceive the exercise as 
more threatening. As such, we code the percentage increase from the previous iteration of an 
exercise. For example, many countries repeat exercises on an annual or biannual basis. In 2011, 
Russia’s Center military exercise used 12,000 personnel, while Center 2015 increased in size to 
Figure 4: Increasing Magnitude Data Source: “People's Liberation Navy - Offshore Defense,” Global Security, accessed April 17, 2016, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-doctrine-offshore.htm. 
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95,000 personnel.137 This would indicate a high threat exercise. New exercises are coded as high 
threat, because they may signal a change in intentions or motives. The coding rules for the 
percentage force increase is shown below in the table: 
 
Percentage Increase Threat Level 
> 25% increase High (3) 
0-25% increase Medium (2) 
< 0% increase Low (1) 
 
Force Size 
The threat level of force size is based on the standard U.S. Army unit size. A military 
exercise which exercises a force less than a two regiments in size (3,000 personnel) is coded as 
low threat. An exercise involving a force greater than two regiments, but less than a division 
(3,000-10,000 personnel) is coded as a medium threat. Force sizes equivalent to a division (10,000 
personnel) or larger are coded as highly threatening to the adversary. 
 
Overall Participation Threat Level 
> 10,000 High (3) 
3,000-10,000 Medium (2) 
< 1,500 Low (1) 
 
                                                 137 See Matthew Bodner, “Russia Launches Largest Military Maneuvers of 2015,” The Moscow Times, September 14, 2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-launches-largest-military-maneuvers-of-2015/530316.html; Richard Weitz. “Kazakhstan and Russia Complete Aldaspan-2012 Military Exercises,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 9, no. 139, July 23, 2012, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39662&cHash=3b6c48e03e04ddfbe79453f038eea106#.VxYVcPkrLIV  
49  
Force Mix 
 We also code exercises based on the force mix of the participating military unit because 
certain types of military units are more threatening than others.138 Exercises may serve as a cover 
for war preparations, so exercising units capable of taking territory or launching debilitating strikes 
presents the highest threat. The high threat exercises include all-arms exercises, as well as 
combined arms exercises that involve ground forces with supporting airframes. Medium threat 
exercises involve airframes, or mixed naval and air units. Naval and command post exercises are 
coded as the least threatening. Lastly, while the effects of space and cyber exercises require more 
research, nuclear exercises create a high potential threat. 
 
Force Mix Threat Level 
All arms integration, ground forces, nuclear integration High (3) 
Air or air and naval forces Medium (2) 
Naval forces, command post exercises Low (1) 
Space and cyber also contribute to the force mix threat. 
 
Transparency 
We code transparency based on a scale ranging from no notice exercises to exercises with 
adversary participation. Because long notice of over six months is standard for military exercises, 
this level of notice is considered the baseline. Less transparent exercises can add to the threat level 
of the exercise, while including the adversary as an observer or participant mitigates some of the  
 
                                                 138 Barry Blechman & Stephen S Kapaln, Force Without War (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1979) 
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risk of the exercise. The table below shows the transparency spectrum of threat, as well as the 
specific weight we assign each level of transparency: 
 Most Threatening     Least Threatening 
Notice Concealed Snap, Short Notice Long Notice Long Notice Long Notice Long Notice 
Adversarial Participation None None None Observers Limited Force Participation Full Force Participation 
Threat Level High (+.5) High (+.5) Medium (0) Medium (0) Low (-.5) Low (-.5) 
 
Composite Threat Level Ranking 
After assigning individual scores for proximity, magnitude, and transparency, we created 
a composite score for threat. Because proximity and magnitude are the two most important 
determinates of threat, we first average the threat ranking for the two variables, using the numerical 
score assigned to each variable. Because transparency increases the threat or can mitigate these 
risks, we then add or subtract the point values of transparency from the overall score. 
(ܲݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ +  ܯܽ݃݊݅ݐݑ݀݁)/2 ± ܶݎܽ݊ݏ݌ܽݎ݁  =  ܥ݋ܾ݉݅݊݁݀ ܶℎݎ݁ܽݐ ܮ݁ݒ݈݁ ܴܽ݊݇݅݊݃ 
 
Political Environment 
We code the political environment as “non-hostile” or “hostile,” based on the number of 
provocative acts and diplomatic overtures in the previous year between the country running the 
exercise and the adversary. We focus on both military actions and political efforts. Among our 
measures, we count provocative military actions, including changes in force basing, shows of 
force, military invasions, skirmishes, and conflict, as well as positive overtures like mil-to-mil 
cooperation. We also examine both hostile and positive political acts, such as levying or removing 
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sanctions, ousting or strengthening the relationship between political figures and international 
organizations, and suspending or joining treaties. This allows us to determine when a political 
relationship is hostile and when it is non-hostile. 
This is a rough measurement, as the political relationship between countries may change 
quickly, be difficult to determine, or be characterized by hostility on only one side. Below we 
include our characterization of the U.S.–Russian relationship. Although multiple events factored 
into our characterizations, we list only the most significant. 
 
U.S. – Soviet and Russian Relationship, 1969 – 2016139 
Non-Hostile Hostile 
 1969 – 1974  Military build-up continues, despite détente 
1974 – 1978  Détente  SALT II 
1979 – 1989  Soviets invade Afghanistan  Reagan elected  Downing of KAL 007 
1989 – 1998  Dissolution of USSR February 1998 – June 1999  Kosovo 
July 1999 – March 2003   Moscow Treaty April 2003 – 2009  NATO expansion Russo-Georgian War 
2010 – Aug 2012  “Russian reset”  New START 
September 2012 – present  Russia ousts USAID  Magnitsky Act  Crimea  Ukraine 
 
                                                 139 See “Russia Profile Timeline.” BBC News. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17840446; see also U.S. Department of State. Highlights in the History of U.S. Relations with Russia, 1780-June 2006. May 11, 2007. http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/200years/c30272.htm. 
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Predicted Risk 
We predict risks based on the political environment and threat level of the exercise, using 
the Risk Matrix. Exercises are first divided by 
the political environment. Accidents and 
hostility are the highest risks an exercise in a 
non-hostile environment is likely to create. 
Exercises in a hostile environment may lead 
to crisis or reciprocity. Any exercise with an 
overall medium-high (2.5) threat score or 
higher falls in the upper category—risking hostility or crisis, depending on the political 
environment. Any exercise with a rank below this falls into the lower half of the Risk Matrix—
risking accidents or reciprocity. 
 
Outcome Determination 
To code the outcomes of a case, we examine the months between the exercise’s 
announcement, the duration of the exercise, and the month immediately following the exercise. 
We code only for the highest risk an exercise creates. For example, while many reciprocal 
exercises cause hostility, we code only for reciprocity, as it is the highest risk. 
A case is coded as having an “accident” only if there is an unintentional incident involving 
military to military contact between the country running the exercise and the adversary. Although 
many exercises result have resulted in accidental deaths or loss of equipment, we are only 
concerned with accidents involving the adversary. 
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We code for “hostility” based on negative political statements about an exercise. Although 
we can often measure a down-turn in the political relationship following an exercise, this metric 
is less clear—as military exercises can both contribute to and be leading indicators of a worsening 
political relationship. 
We code “reciprocity” if the adversary holds a military exercise immediately prior, during, 
or after another military exercise. To control for the ubiquity of military exercises, we focus on 
exercises which are new, close, or unannounced. 
We code a “crisis” if the adversary takes non-exercise related military action following a 
military exercise. This includes (but is not limited to) putting forces on alert, temporarily deploying 
forces, and fighting between the country and adversary. 
 
Determining the Mission and Adversary 
Although our framework allows for the evaluation of risk from any potential adversary’s 
perspective, we focus on the U.S. and potential U.S. adversaries when calculating the risks military 
exercises create. We evaluate cases based on the closest adversary. In Europe and the Arctic, we 
examine cases from the perspective of Russia and the U.S. In Asia, we analyze threat from the 
perspective of China and the U.S. However, any country dyad could be examined in the place of 
these adversaries. 
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Appendix B: Additional Case Studies 
Accidents: RIMPAC 2014 
In 2014, the U.S. held RIMPAC 2014, a low 
threat exercise which risked an accident. During the 
exercise, in which the PRC participated, the Chinese 
navy sent a Dongdiao class auxiliary general 
intelligence (AGI) ship to gather communication and 
electronic data from other ships and aircraft without notice.141 Although an incident did not occur, 
the exercise could have led to an accident, because China’s covert surveillance was unanticipated. 
RIMPAC was a low threat exercise, held while relations were non-hostile. In 2014, the 
political relationship between the U.S. and China was non-hostile. In June 2013, Presidents Barack 
Obama and Xi Jinping met in California to forge a “new model” of relations between their 
countries. 142 Their discussions covered topics such cybersecurity, North Korea’s nuclear program, 
the economy, and climate change.143 The two countries also held a Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue in Beijing in June 2014.144 Although there were areas of contention, the relationship was 
non-hostile. 
                                                 140 See the “Bush School Military Exercises Dataset” for specific coding. 141 Zachary Keck, “China is Spying on RIMPAC,” The Diplomat, July 20, 2014, accessed May 2, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/china-is-spying-on-rimpac/. 142 Greg Botelho, Dan Merica and Jessica Yellin, “Despite Tensions, U.S. Chinese Leaders Talk of Forging ‘New Model’ in Relations,” CNN Politics, June 9, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/07/politics/us-china-summit-cyber-spying/index.html. 143 Ibid. 144 U.S. Department of State, U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue to be Held in Beijing, China, on July 9-10, 2014, June 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/06/228571.htm 
RIMPAC 2014 Ranking140 
Political Environment Non-hostile 
Proximity Low 
Magnitude High 
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Composite Threat Score Low 
Predicted Risk Accidents 
Outcome None 
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 During this time, the U.S. held RIMPAC 2014—the largest multinational maritime 
exercise in the world.145 In total, twenty-two nations participated, 146 including China.147 The 
number of forces exercised was large, with 25,000 troops, 49 ships, six submarines, and more than 
200 aircraft.148 However, the area of the exercise was 
non-threatening, as it was held in the United States’ 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around the Hawaiian 
Islands and southern California.149 Because of the 
Chinese participation, transparency was high. This was 
the first time China had been invited to participate in 
RIMPAC. 150 Although the magnitude was large, the 
non-threatening proximity and high transparency offset the threat level of the exercise. With a non-
hostile relationship and as a low-medium threat exercise, the exercise risked an accident. 
Despite participating in the exercise, the PRC sent an AIG spy ship to RIMPAC 2014.151 
While no serious accidents occurred during the exercise, the potential for misperception or an 
accident due to China’s intelligence gathering put other participating countries on edge.152 China’s 
response to the exercise created the risk of a ship-to-ship accident, personnel misunderstanding, or 
equipment failure, all of which could have resulted in negative consequences. This highlights how 
                                                 145 Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, RIMPAC 2014, 2014, http://www.cpf.navy.mil/rimpac/2014/.  146 Ibid. 147 U.S. Navy, “RIMPAC 2014: The Evolution of Cohesiveness,” NAVY Live, July 31, 2014, http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2014/07/31/rimpac-2014-the-evolution-of-cohesiveness/. 148 Michael Fabey, “Why Did China Participate in RIMPAC with One Ship And Spy on it with Another?” Aviation Week Network, accessed August 15, 2014, http://aviationweek.com/military-government/why-did-china-participate-rimpac-one-ship-and-spy-it-another. 149 Paul Szoldra, “China Deploys Spy Ship Off the Coast of Hawaii,” Business Insider, July 18, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/china-spy-ship-hawaii-2014-7. 150 U.S. Navy, “RIMPAC 2014: The Evolution of Cohesiveness.” 151  Keck, “China is Spying.” 152 Szoldra, “China Deploys Spy Ship Off the Coast of Hawaii.” 
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even low threat exercises can risk accidents as an adversary may react in unanticipated or 
dangerous ways. 
 
Hostility: Cold Response 2012 
In March 2012, NATO conducted an annual 
military exercise, Cold Response, in Northern Norway.  
Although the political environment was non-hostile, 
Russia condemned the exercise, creating a negative 
political outcome. 
As previously discussed, in 2012 the U.S., NATO, and Russia had a relatively non-hostile 
relationship. In addition to the “Russian reset,” NATO and Russia were cooperating on counter-
terrorism, anti-hijacking ventures, and nuclear issues.154 Russia was also allowing NATO to supply 
troops in Afghanistan through the NDN.155 In this environment, Cold Response 2012 contributed 
to the deteriorating relationship which followed throughout the end of 2012 and 2013. 
Cold Response was a high threat NATO 
exercise. Although it was a repeated exercise, the 2012 
iteration was especially threatening to Russia. Although 
NATO’s stated mission for Cold Response 2012 was to 
“rehearse high intensity Crisis Response Operations in 
winter conditions,”156 the magnitude and location were 
                                                 153 See the “Bush School Military Exercises Dataset” for specific coding. 154 Nichol, Russian Political. 155 Kuchins and Sanderson, “Northern Distribution Network.” 156 “NATO Exercise ‘Cold Response 2012’: A Crisis Response Operation or a Provocation to Russia? NATO Watch, March 5, 2012. http://natowatch.org/node/635 
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threatening. The magnitude of the exercise was high. The exercise included 16,000 personnel, with 
representation from all three services of the fifteen participating NATO countries. This was the 
“largest military exercise in Norway in ten years.”157 Additionally, the exercise location was 
threatening. It was held in the northern Norway, extremely close to the Barents Sea, an area with 
major Arctic trading routes used by Russia.158 Because of the non-hostile political environment 
and the high threat level of Cold Response 2012, the exercise risked a hostile political response. 
The Russians viewed Cold Response 2012 as extremely provocative. They claimed the 
exercise was a “sign of NATO wanting to strengthen its geopolitical and diplomatic efforts with 
military might.”159 President Putin issued strongly negative statements in response to Cold 
Response 2012.160 Although Cold Response 2012 was only a contributing factor, over the next 
three years, the relationship between the two countries deteriorated further. Because of the location 
and magnitude, Cold Response 2012 was highly threatening to Russia and resulted in negative 
political repercussions. 
To mitigate the risks of a potential hostile response, NATO could have scaled down the 
size of the exercise. Between 2006 and 2010, Cold Response exercises had force sizes ranging 
from 7,500 to 10,000.161 The sharp increase in 2012, which nearly doubled the magnitude, 
contributed to the threatening nature of the exercise.162 Although proximity was also high, 
mitigating this risk would have been difficult, because the mission was designed to test actions in 
winter conditions. 
                                                 157 Ibid. 158 Ibid. 159 “Russia Finds NATO Exercise in Norway Provocative,” The Nordic Page, March 14, 2012, http://www.tnp.no/norway/panorama/2791-russia-finds-nato-exercise-in-norway-provocative. 160 Ibid. 161 Rick Rozoff, “TOP OF THE WORLD: NATO Rehearses For War In The Arctic.” Global Research, April 24, 2012. http://www.globalresearch.ca/top-of-the-world-nato-rehearses-for-war-in-the-arctic/30508. 162 Ibid. 
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Cold Response 2012 shows how a high threat military exercise, even in a non-hostile 
relationship, can spark hostile rhetoric and actions. Because Cold Response 2012 was large and 
held in close proximity to Russian interests, Russia responded with hostility. 
 
Reciprocity: Trident Juncture 2015 and Center 2015 
Between 2014 and 2015, NATO and Russia 
entered into a spiral of reciprocal military exercises. 
During this period, NATO ran Trident Juncture 2015, 
the largest NATO exercise since the Cold War.164 
Russia ran Center 2015, an exercise twice as large, 
involving nearly 100,000 personnel.165 These exercises highlight the escalatory dangers of 
reciprocity. 
When NATO held Trident Juncture 2015, it was 
the largest NATO exercise since the Cold War.166 In 
total, 36,000 personnel participated, including 140 
aircraft and more than 60 ships.167 Trident Juncture 
2015’s mission was to address “hybrid warfare threats 
and other new tactics of war,”168 Secretary General Jens 
                                                 163 See the “Bush School Military Exercises Dataset” for specific coding. 164 Brian Reynolds. “Operation Trident Juncture shows America flexing its military muscle.” Chron. November 11, 2015. http://www.chron.com/news/nation-world/article/Operation-Trident-Juncture-shows-America-6625099.php. 165 Lukasz Kulesa, “Towards a New Equilibrium: Minimizing the risks of NATO and Russia’s new military postures,” European Leadership Network, February 2016, 44, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/medialibrary/2016/02/07/180d69f6/Towards%20a%20New%20Equilibrium%202016.pdf. 166 Reynolds, “Operation Trident Juncture.” 167 Ibid. 168 Ibid. 
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Stoltenberg’s also stated that “NATO is able to defend all Allies against any threat.”169 Both the 
mission of the exercise and statements by high level officials may have indicated hostility towards 
Russia, particularly as Russia had used hybrid warfare in the past.170 In spite of this rhetoric, NATO 
did take steps to moderate the risk to Russia—giving two years notice and holding the exercise 
outside of Russia’s border region and areas of influence. NATO also invited observers from all 
member nations of the OSCE.171 Proximity was low, as the exercise was primarily held in Spain, 
Italy, and Portugal.172 Because of the high number of personnel, the potential targeting of Russia, 
and the risk mitigation strategies, the exercise posed a medium-high threat to Russia, which created 
the potential for crisis and reciprocity. 
Less than two months before Trident Juncture 
2015, Russia held Center 2015, an extremely large 
military exercise in the central and south regions of 
Russia.174 Although Center 2015 was held two months 
prior to the NATO exercise, because Trident Juncture 
2015 was announced two years in advance, the Russian exercise was likely reciprocal. 
Although Center 2015 was a repeated exercise, the scale and complexity of the exercise 
dramatically increased in 2015. Center 2015 involved over 95,000 Russian personnel, 170 aircraft, 
20 ships and over 7,000 pieces of combat equipment.175 This was vastly larger than previous Center 
                                                 169 “Trident Juncture shows NATO capabilities ‘are real and ready’,” NATO, November 4, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_124265.htm. 170 Whitmore, “Did Russia Plan Its War In Georgia?” 171 Ibid. 172 “Trident Juncture Shows NATO Capabilities are Real and Ready.” 173 See the “Bush School Military Exercises Dataset” for specific coding. 174 “Russia to Hold More Large Scale Military Maneuvers in 2015,” Russia Today, December 1, 2014, https://www.rt.com/news/210451-russia-maneuvers-center-2015/. 175 Bodner, “Russia Launches Largest Military Maneuvers of 2015.” 
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exercises conducted in 2008 and 2011. Center 2008 utilized only 2,000 Russian and Kazakh troops 
and Center 2011 exercised 12,000 combined troops.176 The stated objective of Center 2015 was to 
react to conflict in Central Asia, however, the timing of the exercise and the mission testing 
“territorial defense and mobilization deployment,”177 both appeared to threaten NATO. 
For both exercises, steps could have been taken 
to reduce the risk of a response by altering the 
magnitude of the exercises. While NATO did take steps 
to mitigate the risk by choosing a distant location and 
inviting on observers, the provocative rhetoric 
surrounding the exercise contributed to the risk. 
Additionally, Russia’s dramatic force increase from 
previous iterations and relative lack of transparency contributed to the threat level of Center 2015. 
Steps could have been taken during the planning stages of both military exercises to mitigate risks, 
by moderating rhetoric and altering the magnitude of the exercises. 
Trident Juncture 2015 and Center 2015 show the dangers of tit-for-tat reciprocal exercises, 
which have continued to increase in magnitude and frequency since Russia’s seizure of Crimea 
and the Ukraine crisis. The hostile political relationship between NATO and Russia contributes to 
mutual distrust and creates incentives to run larger military exercises for training, reassurance, and 
deterrence purposes. This creates compounded dangers, as Russia’s reciprocal exercises vastly 
outnumber the size of the NATO exercises.178 Furthermore, because Russia has used military 
                                                 176 Weitz. “Kazakhstan and Russia Complete Aldaspan-2012 Military Exercises.” 177 “Russia to hold more.” 178 United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, “NATO Russia Exercise Gap,” April 28, 2015, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/NATO-Russia%20Exercise%20Gap%20Chart%20Mk.III_Brzezinski_04-28-15.pdf. 
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exercises to mask invasion forces in the past, large military exercises with little notice appear 
threatening and may act as cover for future invasion forces. 
 
Crises: Exercise Brasstacks 1986 
In 1986, India ran Exercise Brasstacks, a highly 
threatening and massive military exercise along 
Pakistan’s border. 179 At the time, the political 
relationship with Pakistan was extremely hostile. In 
response to the exercise, Pakistan mobilized troops and 
took battle positions, forcing the Indians military to cease maneuvers.180 
 In the lead up to 1986 exercise, India and Pakistan had a hostile political relationship. In 
1984, Pakistani government white papers were leaked detailing how Pakistani forces could 
undermine Indian rule in the Punjab region.181 Shortly thereafter, the Indian government claimed 
to have evidence that Pakistan was materially supporting separatists in the same region.182 In 1986, 
India faced a wave of anti-Muslim riots.183 Because of these factors, when Exercise Brasstacks 
was run, the political relationship between Pakistan and India was hostile. 
In 1986, India held Exercise Brasstacks, a highly threatening exercise with large magnitude 
exercise, close proximity, and little transparency. It was designed to test new equipment and 
                                                 179 Steven R. Weiseman, “On India’s Border, a Huge Mock War,” March 6, 1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/06/world/on-india-s-border-a-huge-mock-war.html. 180 Ibid. 181 James Heitzman and Robert L. Worden, eds, India: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1995). 182 “Operation Brasstacks 1986-87,” HistoryPak, accessed May 1, 2016, http://historypak.com/brasstack-crisis-1986-87/. 183 Heitzman and Worden, India: A Country Study. 
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maneuver warfare concepts.184 The actions India took when planning this exercise sent a 
threatening signal to Pakistan. The exercise had over 500,000 troops (when including the naval 
annex).185 There was all-arms integration, including a significant naval annex, with Indian Navy 
vessels exercising in the waters off of Gwadar, Pakistan’s only major port.186 Additionally, Indian 
forces were exercised in extremely sensitive locations near the Pakistani border. The exercise was 
held in Rajasthan, less than 100 miles from the Pakistani border.187 From the exercise location, 
India could have launched an assault to bisect Pakistan.188 Additionally, transparency was very 
low. The exercise had never been held before and India sent no official communication to Pakistan 
explaining the exercise.189 This all contributed to a high threat exercise. 
Because of the extremely threatening nature of 
the exercise, during a hostile political relationship, 
Exercise Brasstacks risked and precipitated a crisis. The 
exercise appeared to signal Indian intentions to invade 
Pakistan in the immediate future. Pakistan responded by 
mobilizing its forces and taking battle positions. During 
the same period, India responded by counter-mobilizing 
along the border. Indian and Pakistani leaders worked to resolve the crisis in what has become to 
be known as the period of “cricket diplomacy,” eventually agreeing to a ceasefire and removal of 
troops from the border regions.190 
                                                 184  “Brasstacks,” Global Security, accessed May 1, 2016, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/brass-tacks.htm. 185 Ibid. 186 Prem Nath Hoon, “War Games or War?” Excerpt from Lt Gen Hoon’s book, accessed May 1, 2016, http://www.hoonslegacy.com/brass-tacks/  187 “Brasstacks,” Global Security. 188 Ibid.  189 Ibid. 190 “Pakistan and the World During the Zia Regime,” Pakistan Defence Journal, Retrieved 1 May 2016. 
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India could have taken several steps to mitigate the risk of a crisis. The troops could have 
been exercised in other locations, further from the border. The size of the exercise could have been 
lowered, with different divisions operating at alternating times. And lastly, transparency could 
have been increased. Although participation would be unlikely, India could have offered Pakistan 
a limited observer status or provided more details on the exercise to increase transparency. 
Ultimately, because of the political environment and high threat level of the exercise, 
Exercise Brasstacks precipitated a crisis situation between India and Pakistan. 
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Appendix C: Overview of the Bush School Military Exercise Dataset 
More detailed information on these military exercises may be found in the Bush School Military Exercises Dataset.
Year Exercise Country A (Running) 
2016 Cobra Gold US, Thailand 
2016 Cold Response Feb 16 NATO 
2016 Cope Tiger US, Thailand, Singapore 
2016 Key Resolve US, ROK 
2016 RIMPAC US 
2016 Snap Ukraine Apr 16 Russia 
2015 Airborne Forces Feb 15 Russia 
2015 Allied Shield June 15 NATO 
2015 Arctic Challenge 15 Norway, Sweden, Finland 
2015 Balikatan US, Philippines 
2015 Baltic Snap Mar 15 Russia 
2015 BALTOPS Jun 15 NATO 
2015 Barents Rescue 15 Finland, Russia, Norway, Sweden 
2015 Capable Logistician NATO and Partners 
2015 Center 15 Russia 
2015 Cobra Gold US, Thailand 
2015 Combat Commonwealth 15 Russia 
2015 Cooperation Aug 15 Russia 
2015 Dragon Oct 15 Poland 
2015 Dynamic Mongoose NATO 
2015 Han Kuang 31 Taiwan 
2015 Hedgehog 2015 Estonia 
2015 Immediate Response 15 US, PfP 
2015 Interaction 15 Russia 
2015 Iron Sword Nov 15 NATO 
2015 Joint Viking Mar 15 Norway 
2015 Joint Warrior 15 UK 
2015 Keen Sword Japan, US 
2015 Key Resolve US, ROK 
Year Exercise Country A (Running) 
 2015 Noble Jump Jun 15 NATO 
2015 Rapid Trident 15 NATO 
2015 Saber Junction Apr 15 Germany 
2015 Saber Strike Jun 15 NATO 
2015 Sea Breeze 15 Ukraine 
2015 Sea Shield 15 Romania 
2015 Snap AF & Def May 15 Russia 
2015 Snap Arctic March 15 Russia 
2015 Spring Storm May 15 Estonia 
2015 Steadfast Javelin NATO 
2015 Strategic Nuclear Oct 15 Russia 
2015 Strategic Nuclear Sept 15 Russia 
2015 Swift Response Aug-Sept 15 US 
2015 Talisman Saber Australia, USA 
2015 Trident Joust Jun 15 NATO 
2015 Trident Juncture 15 NATO 
2015 Trident Poseidon 15 NATO 
2015 Union Shield Sept 15 Russia 
2015 Vostok 10 Russia 
2015 Wind Spring Apr 15 Romania 
2014 Anakonda Sep-Oct 14 Poland 
2014 Balikatan US, Philippines 
2014 Black Eagle Nov 14 Poland 
2014 Bold Alligator 14 US 
2014 Central Snap Jun 14 Russia 
2014 Cobra Gold US, Thailand 
2014 Cold Response 14 Norway 
2014 Danube Express Oct 14 Romania 
2014 Han Kuang 30 Taiwan 
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Year Exercise Country A (Running) 
2014 Iron Sword Nov 14 NATO 
2014 Joint Warrior 14 UK 
2014 Keen Sword Japan, US 
2014 Noble Justification 14 NATO 
2014 Noble Ledger Sep-Oct 14 NATO 
2014 Peace Mission 14 Russia 
2014 RIMPAC US 
2014 Saber Junction Aug 14 NATO 
2014 Saber Strike Jun 14 Baltics 
2014 Snap East 14 Russia 
2014 Snap East Jul 14 Russia 
2014 Snap East Sep 14 Russia 
2014 Snap March 14 Russia 
2014 Spring Storm 14 Estonia 
2014 Steadfast Javelin 1 Estonia 
2014 Steadfast Javelin 2 Sept 14 Baltics 
2014 Strategic Nuclear May 14 Russia 
2014 Ukraine Snap Apr-May 14 Russia 
2014 Valiant Shield US 
2014 Vostok 14 Russia 
2014 Vostok 14 Rocket Sept Russia 
2014 Western Snap Dec 14 Russia 
2014 Western Snap Feb-Mar 14 Russia 
2013 Aerospace Def Snap May Russia 
2013 AF Snap Jun 13 Russia 
2013 Arctic Challenge 13 NATO 
2013 Balikatan US, Philippines 
2013 Boevoe Sodruzhestvo Russia 
2013 Capable Logistician NATO and Partners 
2013 Cobra Gold US, Thailand 
2013 Han Kuang 29 Taiwan 
2013 Joint Warrior 13 UK 
2013 Northern Fleet 13 Russia 
2013 Pomor 13 Russia 
Year Exercise Country A (Running) 
2013 Sea Breeze 13 NATO (PfP) 
2013 Snap Central Feb 13 Russia 
2013 Snap East Jul 13 Russia 
 2013 Snap South Mar 13 Russia 
2013 Spring Storm 13 Estonia 
2013 Steadfast Jazz 13 NATO 
2013 Strategic Rocket Jul 13 Russia 
2013 Talisman Saber Australia, USA 
2013 Zapad 2013 Russia 
2012 Aldaspan 12 Russia 
2012 Balikatan US, Philippines 
2012 Bold Alligator 12 US 
2012 Cobra Gold US, Thailand 
2012 Cold Response 12 Norway 
2012 Han Kuang 28 Taiwan 
2012 Kavkaz 12 Russia 
2012 Pomor 12 Russia 
2012 RIMPAC US 
2012 Rubezh 2012 Russia 
2012 Sea Breeze 12 NATO (PfP) 
2011 Balikatan US, Philippines 
2011 Bold Alligator 11 US 
2011 Center 11 Russia 
2011 Cobra Gold US, Thailand 
2011 Combat Commonwealth 11 Russia 
2011 Han Kuang 27 Taiwan 
2011 Immediate Response 11 US 
2011 Pomor 11 Russia 
2011 Schit Soiuza 2011 Russia 
2011 Sea Breeze 11 NATO (PfP) 
2011 Shygys 11 Russia 
2011 Talisman Saber Australia, USA 
2010 Cold Response 10 Norway 
2010 Peace Mission 10 Russia 
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Year Exercise Country A (Running) 
2010 RIMPAC US 
2010 Sea Breeze 10 NATO (PfP) 
2009 Cold Response 09 Norway 
2009 Cooperative Longbow/Lancer NATO, PfP 
 2009 Immediate Response 09 US 
2009 Kavkaz 09 Russia 
2009 Talisman Saber Australia, USA 
2009 Zapad 2009 Russia 
2008 Center 08 Russia 
2008 Immediate Response 08 US 
2008 Kavkaz 08 Russia 
2008 RIMPAC US 
2008 Sea Breeze 08 NATO (PfP) 
2008 Stability Russia 
2007 Balikatan US, Philippines 
2007 Cold Response 07 Norway 
2007 Cooperative Longbow/Lancer NATO, PfP 
2007 Immediate Response 07 US 
2007 Northern Edge/Alaska Shield US 
2007 Peace Mission 07 Russia 
2007 Sea Breeze 07 NATO (PfP) 
2007 Talisman Saber Australia, USA 
2007 Valiant Shield US 
2006 Balikatan US, Philippines 
2006 Cold Response 06 Norway 
2006 Cooperative Longbow/Lancer NATO, PfP 
2006 RIMPAC US 
2006 Rubezh 2006 Russia 
2006 Russia-Belarus Russia 
2006 Valiant Shield US 
2005 Balikatan US, Philippines 
2005 Han Kuang 21 Taiwan 
2005 JASEX US 
2005 Peace Mission 05 Russia 
Year Exercise Country A (Running) 
 2005 Rubezh 2005 Russia 
2005 Talisman Saber Australia, USA 
2004 Balikatan US, Philippines 
2004 Han Kuang 20 Taiwan 
2004 RIMPAC US 
2004 Rubezh 2004 Russia 
2003 Balikatan US, Philippines 
2003 Tandem Thrust US 
2002 Balikatan US, Philippines 
2002 RIMPAC US 
2002 Sea Breeze 02 NATO (PfP) 
2001 Balikatan US, Philippines 
2001 Sea Breeze 01 NATO (PfP) 
2001 Tandem Thrust US, Australia 
2000 Cooperative Best Effort 00 NATO 
2000 RIMPAC  US 
2000 Summer-X Russia 
1999 Sea Breeze 99 NATO (PfP) 
1999 Tandem Thrust US, Australia 
1999 Zapad (West) - 99 Russia 
1998 RIMPAC US 
1998 Sea Breeze 98 NATO (PfP) 
1997 Tandem Thrust US, Australia 
1995 Tandem Thrust US 
1994 Atlantic Resolve NATO 
1993 Reforger 93 CPX Chariot Fury NATO 
1992 Reforger 92 CPX Certain Caravan NATO 
1991 Reforger 91 CPX Certain Shield NATO 
1990 Reforger 90 Centurion Shield NATO 
1988 Reforger 88 Certain Challenge NATO 
1987 Reforger 87 Certain Strike NATO 
1986 Reforger 86 Certain Sentinel NATO 
1986 Exercise Brasstacks  India 
1985 Reforger 85 Central Guardian NATO 
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Year Exercise Country A (Running) 
1984 Reforger 84 Certain Fury NATO 
1983 Reforger 83 Confident Enterprise NATO 
1983 Able Archer/Autumn Forge NATO 
1982 Reforger 82 Carbine Fortress NATO 
1981 Reforger 81 Certain Encounter NATO 
1981 Zapad 81 USSR 
1980 Reforger 80 Certain Rampart NATO 
1979 Reforger 79 Certain Sentinel NATO 
1978 Reforger 78 Certain Shield NATO 
1977 Reforger 77 Carbon Edge NATO 
1976 Reforger 76 Lares Team NATO 
1976 Reforger 76 Gordian Shield NATO 
1975 Reforger 75 Certain Trek NATO 
1974 Reforger 74 Certain Pledge NATO 
1973 Reforger IV Certain Shield NATO 
1973 Reforger V Certain Charge NATO 
1971 Reforger III Certain Forge NATO 
1970 Reforger II Certain Thurst NATO 
1969 Reforger I Carbide Ice NATO 
1994 Atlantic Resolve NATO 
1993 Reforger 93 CPX Chariot Fury NATO 
1992 Reforger 92 CPX Certain Caravan NATO 
1991 Reforger 91 CPX Certain Shield NATO 
1990 Reforger 90 Centurion Shield NATO 
1988 Reforger 88 Certain Challenge NATO 
1987 Reforger 87 Certain Strike NATO 
1986 Reforger 86 Certain Sentinel NATO 
1986 Exercise Brasstacks  India 
1985 Reforger 85 Central Guardian NATO 
1984 Reforger 84 Certain Fury NATO 
1983 Reforger 83 Confident Enterprise NATO 
1983 Able Archer/Autumn Forge NATO 
1982 Reforger 82 Carbine Fortress NATO 
1981 Reforger 81 Certain Encounter NATO 
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